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The impact of economic regulation on attempts to curb expense preference behavior: a micro-data analysis of CEO compensation schemes for electric utilities


  • Mixon Jr., Franklin G.
  • Upadhyaya, Kamal P.


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  • Mixon Jr., Franklin G. & Upadhyaya, Kamal P., 1999. "The impact of economic regulation on attempts to curb expense preference behavior: a micro-data analysis of CEO compensation schemes for electric utilities," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(2), pages 185-194, April.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:eneeco:v:21:y:1999:i:2:p:185-194

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
    2. Upadhyaya, Kamal P. & Raymond, Jeannie E. & Mixon, Franklin Jr., 1997. "The economic theory of regulation versus alternative theories for the electric utilities industry: A simultaneous probit model," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 191-202, August.
    3. Paul L. Joskow & Nancy L. Rose & Catherine Wolfram, 1996. "Political Constraints on Executive Compensation: Evidence from the Electric Utility Industry," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 27(1), pages 165-182, Spring.
    4. De Alessi, Louis, 1974. "Managerial Tenure under Private and Government Ownership in the Electric Power Industry," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 82(3), pages 645-653, May/June.
    5. Jarrell, Gregg A, 1978. "The Demand for State Regulation of the Electric Utility Industry," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 21(2), pages 269-295, October.
    6. Davis Dechert, W., 1984. "Has the averch-johnson effect been theoretically justified?," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 1-17, October.
    7. Caudill, Steven B & Im, Bae-Geun & Kaserman, David L, 1993. "Modeling Regulatory Behavior: The Economic Theory of Regulation versus Alternative Theories and Simple Rules of Thumb," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 5(3), pages 251-262, September.
    8. Fama, Eugene F, 1980. "Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 88(2), pages 288-307, April.
    9. Moore, Charles Guy, 1975. "Has Electricity Regulation Resulted in Higher Prices? An Econometric Evaluation Utilizing a Calibrated Regulatory Input Variable," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 13(2), pages 207-220, June.
    10. Peltzman, Sam, 1976. "Toward a More General Theory of Regulation," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 19(2), pages 211-240, August.
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    Cited by:

    1. Gropper, Daniel M. & Hudson, Carl D., 2003. "A note on savings and loan ownership structure and expense preference: A re-examination," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 27(10), pages 2003-2014, October.
    2. Fumagalli, Elena & Garrone, Paola & Grilli, Luca, 2007. "Service quality in the electricity industry: The role of privatization and managerial behavior," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 35(12), pages 6212-6224, December.

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