The impact of economic regulation on attempts to curb expense preference behavior: a micro-data analysis of CEO compensation schemes for electric utilities
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- Peltzman, Sam, 1976.
"Toward a More General Theory of Regulation,"
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- Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
- Moore, Charles Guy, 1975. "Has Electricity Regulation Resulted in Higher Prices? An Econometric Evaluation Utilizing a Calibrated Regulatory Input Variable," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 13(2), pages 207-20, June.
- Jarrell, Gregg A, 1978. "The Demand for State Regulation of the Electric Utility Industry," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 21(2), pages 269-95, October.
- Caudill, Steven B & Im, Bae-Geun & Kaserman, David L, 1993. "Modeling Regulatory Behavior: The Economic Theory of Regulation versus Alternative Theories and Simple Rules of Thumb," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 5(3), pages 251-62, September.
- Davis Dechert, W., 1984. "Has the averch-johnson effect been theoretically justified?," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 1-17, October.
- Paul L. Joskow & Nancy L. Rose & Catherin D. Wolfram, 1994.
"Political Constraints on Executive Compensation: Evidence from the Electric Utility Industry,"
NBER Working Papers
4980, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Paul L. Joskow & Nancy L. Rose & Catherine Wolfram, 1996. "Political Constraints on Executive Compensation: Evidence from the Electric Utility Industry," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 27(1), pages 165-182, Spring.
- Fama, Eugene F, 1980. "Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 88(2), pages 288-307, April.
- Upadhyaya, Kamal P. & Raymond, Jeannie E. & Mixon, Franklin Jr., 1997. "The economic theory of regulation versus alternative theories for the electric utilities industry: A simultaneous probit model," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 191-202, August.
- De Alessi, Louis, 1974. "Managerial Tenure under Private and Government Ownership in the Electric Power Industry," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 82(3), pages 645-53, May/June.
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