Financial Intermediary Balance Sheet Management
Conventional discussions of balance sheet management by nonfinancial firms take the set of positive net present value (NPV) projects as given, which in turn determines the size of the assets of the firm. The focus is on the composition of equity and debt in funding such assets. In contrast, the balance sheet management of financial intermediaries reveals that it is equity that behaves like the predetermined variable, and the asset size of the bank or financial intermediary is determined by the degree of leverage that is permitted by market conditions. The relative stickiness of equity reveals possible non-pecuniary benefits to bank owners so that they are reluctant to raise new equity, even during boom periods when equity raising is associated with less stigma, and hence smaller discounts. We explore the empirical evidence for both market-based financial intermediaries such as the Wall Street investment banks, as well as the commercial bank subsidiaries of the large U.S. bank holding companies (BHCs). We further explore the aggregate consequences of such behavior by the banking sector for the propagation of the financial cycle and securitization.
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Volume (Year): 3 (2011)
Issue (Month): 1 (December)
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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Viral V. Acharya & S. Viswanathan, 2011.
"Leverage, Moral Hazard, and Liquidity,"
Journal of Finance,
American Finance Association, vol. 66(1), pages 99-138, February.
- Viral V. Acharya & S. Viswanathan, 2010. "Leverage, Moral Hazard and Liquidity," NBER Working Papers 15837, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- John Geanakoplos, 2010. "Solving the Present Crisis and Managing the Leverage Cycle," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1751, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- John Geanakoplos, 2010. "Solving the present crisis and managing the leverage cycle," Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, issue Aug, pages 101-131. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)