Do In-Kind Benefits Influence Pharmacistsâ€™ Labor Supply Decisions?
This paper explores whether in-kind benefits influence the labor supply decisions of pharmacists. Particular attention is paid to decisions to supply more than thirty hours of labor per week, when in-kind benefits are usually standard. A distinction is also made between pharmacists in managerial and/or ownership positions and those in traditional staff positions. Using survey data from registered pharmacists in North Dakota, we find that the labor supply determinants for owners/managers and employees are significantly different. We also find that while in-kind benefits do not appear to influence the typical staff pharmacistâ€™s decision of how many hours to work each week, certain, but not all, types of these benefits do influence the decision of the representative owner/manager. Furthermore, the determinants of hours worked, in general, do not differ across the thirty hour per week threshold.
Volume (Year): 41 (2011)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
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