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Economic And Political Considerations In Regional Cooperation Models

Author

Listed:
  • Dinar, Ariel
  • Wolf, Aaron T.

Abstract

Cooperation among players requires a realization of economic benefits to all players and a meeting of efficiency requirements through economically driven allocations. Cooperation among political (and sometimes hostile) players may not meet these requirements. Political considerations, usually ignored in economic analyses, can hinder or even block possible arrangements. A framework is proposed that includes both economic and political considerations for evaluating transfers or trades of scarce resources. This method quantifies both the economic payoffs using n-person game theory and the political likelihood of any of the coalitions actually forming, using the PRINCE Political Accounting System. The economic-political approach is applied to a case of a potential water transfer in the western Middle East. Results suggest that incorporating political considerations in the analysis stabilizes the regional solution suggested by economic-related allocations.

Suggested Citation

  • Dinar, Ariel & Wolf, Aaron T., 1997. "Economic And Political Considerations In Regional Cooperation Models," Agricultural and Resource Economics Review, Northeastern Agricultural and Resource Economics Association, vol. 26(01), pages 1-16, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:arerjl:31355
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.31355
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Gary D. Lynne & J. S. Shonkwiler & Michael E. Wilson, 1991. "Water Permitting Behavior under the 1972 Florida Water Resources Act," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 67(3), pages 340-351.
    2. Shapley, L. S. & Shubik, Martin, 1954. "A Method for Evaluating the Distribution of Power in a Committee System," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 48(3), pages 787-792, September.
    3. Dinar, Ariel & Wolf, Aaron, 1994. "International Markets for Water and the Potential for Regional Cooperation: Economic and Political Perspectives in the Western Middle East," Economic Development and Cultural Change, University of Chicago Press, vol. 43(1), pages 43-66, October.
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    Cited by:

    1. Bar-El Raphael, 2006. "Assessing Regional Cooperation in the Middle East," Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 12(1), pages 70-82, September.
    2. Kelly Tiller & Paul Jakus, 2004. "Explaining Cooperation in Municipal Solid Waste Management," Working Papers 2004-07, Utah State University, Department of Economics.
    3. Schiff, Maurice & Winters, L. Alan, 2002. "Regional cooperation, and the role of international organizations and regional integration," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2872, The World Bank.
    4. Sidibe, Y. & Williams, T.O., 2018. "A comparative analysis of water pricing options on two large-scale irrigation schemes in West Africa," 2018 Conference, July 28-August 2, 2018, Vancouver, British Columbia 276017, International Association of Agricultural Economists.
    5. Gichuki, Francis & McCornick, Peter G., 2008. "International experiences of water transfers: relevance to India," IWMI Conference Proceedings 235175, International Water Management Institute.
    6. Encarna Esteban & Ariel Dinar, 2013. "Cooperative Management of Groundwater Resources in the Presence of Environmental Externalities," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 54(3), pages 443-469, March.
    7. Bar-El Raphael, 2005. "A Typology of Regional Cooperation Projects," Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 11(2), pages 193-207, November.
    8. Tiller, Kelly J. & Jakus, Paul M., 2005. "Applying the Miceli Model to Explain Cooperation in Municipal Solid Waste Management," Agricultural and Resource Economics Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 34(2), pages 217-225, October.
    9. Marianna Khachaturyan & Karina Schoengold, 2019. "Applying Interconnected Game Theory to Analyze Transboundary Waters: A Case Study of the Kura–Araks Basin," Water Economics and Policy (WEP), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 5(01), pages 1-32, January.
    10. Miki Malul & Raphael Bar-El & Dafna Schwartz, 2010. "Patterns of Cooperation in High-Tech—Constraints, Feasibility, and Benefits: Results of a Study among Palestinians and Israelis," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 27(1), pages 67-84, February.
    11. Yu Chen & Anthony G. O. Yeh & Yingxuan Zhang, 2017. "Political tournament and regional cooperation in China: a game theory approach," The Annals of Regional Science, Springer;Western Regional Science Association, vol. 58(3), pages 597-622, May.

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