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Plata y Plomo: How Higher Wages Expose Politicians to Criminal Violence

Author

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  • Massimo Pulejo
  • Pablo Querubín

Abstract

What is the effect of politicians' wages on corruption in the presence of criminal groups that use both bribes and violence? With a regression discontinuity design and three distinct proxies for corruption, we show that better-paid Italian politicians are more likely to promote transparency and competition in procurement but also more likely to incur criminal attacks. The effects of wages, which subside after three years, are driven by changes in incumbents' behavior rather than improved selection. These findings show how higher wages may curb corruption, but also foster the use of violence as an alternative tool to influence policymaking.

Suggested Citation

  • Massimo Pulejo & Pablo Querubín, 2026. "Plata y Plomo: How Higher Wages Expose Politicians to Criminal Violence," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 18(1), pages 190-218, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aejpol:v:18:y:2026:i:1:p:190-218
    DOI: 10.1257/pol.20240383
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Sebastian Calonico & Matias D. Cattaneo & Rocio Titiunik, 2014. "Robust Nonparametric Confidence Intervals for Regression‐Discontinuity Designs," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 82, pages 2295-2326, November.
    2. Gianmarco Daniele & Gemma Dipoppa, 2023. "Fighting Organized Crime by Targeting their Revenue: Screening, Mafias, and Public Funds," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 39(3), pages 722-746.
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • J31 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law

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