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Selective versus Universal Vouchers: Modelling Median Voter Preferences in Education

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  • Edwin G. West
  • Zhiqi Chen

Abstract

Under the majority voting rule, a system of universally available vouchers (UV) is politically less feasible than a system of selective vouchers (SV) confined to families with incomes equal to or less than median voter income. After the introduction of UV, public expenditure on education will have to be shared with previous private school users. Per capita expenditure will then drop and/or tax will increase. Since these events will injure the median voter, he will reject UV. He will be indifferent between the status quo and SV. Indifference will turn into enthusiasm however, if, as can be expected, the new regime (SV) brings effective new competition.
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Suggested Citation

  • Edwin G. West & Zhiqi Chen, 2000. "Selective versus Universal Vouchers: Modelling Median Voter Preferences in Education," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(5), pages 1520-1534, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:90:y:2000:i:5:p:1520-1534 Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.90.5.1520
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    8. Caroline Minter Hoxby, 1994. "Do Private Schools Provide Competition for Public Schools?," NBER Working Papers 4978, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Andrade, Eduardo C., 2007. "Higher Education: (Almost) Free Tuition vs. Quotas vs. Targeted Vouchers," Insper Working Papers wpe_97, Insper Working Paper, Insper Instituto de Ensino e Pesquisa.
    2. Dennis Epple & Richard Romano, 2008. "Educational Vouchers And Cream Skimming," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 49(4), pages 1395-1435, November.
    3. Thomas Fuchs & Ludger Wößmann, 2004. "What Accounts for International Differences in Student Performance? A Re-Examination Using PISA Data (new title: What accounts for international differences in student performance? A re-examination us," CESifo Working Paper Series 1235, CESifo Group Munich.
    4. Piolatto, Amedeo, 2010. "Education and selective vouchers," Economics of Education Review, Elsevier, vol. 29(6), pages 993-1004, December.
    5. Epple, Dennis & Romano, Richard, 2014. "On the political economy of educational vouchers," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, pages 62-73.
    6. Chakrabarti Rajashri, 2013. "Impact of Voucher Design on Public School Performance: Evidence from Florida and Milwaukee Voucher Programs," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, pages 349-394.
    7. Akyol, Metin, 2016. "Do educational vouchers reduce inequality and inefficiency in education?," Economics of Education Review, Elsevier, vol. 55(C), pages 149-167.
    8. Bearse, Peter & Cardak, Buly A. & Glomm, Gerhard & Ravikumar, B., 2013. "Why do education vouchers fail at the ballot box?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, pages 26-37.
    9. Daniel Montolio & Amedeo Piolatto, 2011. "Financing public education when altruistic agents have retirement concerns," Working Papers 2011/30, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB).
    10. Chakrabarti Rajashri, 2013. "Impact of Voucher Design on Public School Performance: Evidence from Florida and Milwaukee Voucher Programs," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, pages 349-394.
    11. Cohen-Zada, Danny & Justman, Moshe, 2005. "The religious factor in private education," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 57(3), pages 391-418, May.
    12. Epple, Dennis & Romano, Richard, 2014. "On the political economy of educational vouchers," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, pages 62-73.
    13. Estevan, Fernanda, 2013. "The impact of conditional cash transfers on public education expenditures: A political economy approach," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 32(C), pages 268-284.
    14. Gradstein, Mark & Justman, Moshe, 2001. "Public Education and the Melting Pot," CEPR Discussion Papers 2924, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • I20 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - General
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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