Selective Versus Universal Vouchers: Modelling Median Voter Preferences in Education
Under the majority voting rule, a system of universally available vouchers (UV) is politically less feasible than a system of selective vouchers (SV) confined to families with incomes equal to or less than median voter income. After the introduction of UV, public expenditure on education will have to be shared with previous private school users. Per capita expenditure will then drop and/or tax will increase. Since these events will injure the median voter, he will reject UV. He will be indifferent between the status quo and SV. Indifference will turn into enthusiasm however, if, as can be expected, the new regime (SV) brings effective new competition.
|Date of creation:||Mar 1998|
|Date of revision:||Dec 2000|
|Publication status:||Published: – revised version in American Economic Review, Vol. 90, No. 5, (December 2000), pp. 1520–1534|
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References listed on IDEAS
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