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Leaders in Social Movements: Evidence from Unions in Myanmar

Author

Listed:
  • Laura Boudreau
  • Rocco Macchiavello
  • Virginia Minni
  • Mari Tanaka

Abstract

Social movements are catalysts for crucial institutional changes. To succeed, they must coordinate members' views (consensus building) and actions (mobilization). We study union leaders within Myanmar's burgeoning labor movement. Union leaders are positively selected on both ability and personality traits that enable them to influence others, yet they earn lower wages. In group discussions about workers' views on an upcoming national minimum wage negotiation, randomly embedded leaders build consensus around the union's preferred policy. In an experiment that mimics individuals decision-making in a collective action setup, leaders increase mobilization through coordination.

Suggested Citation

  • Laura Boudreau & Rocco Macchiavello & Virginia Minni & Mari Tanaka, 2025. "Leaders in Social Movements: Evidence from Unions in Myanmar," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 115(6), pages 1975-2000, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:115:y:2025:i:6:p:1975-2000
    DOI: 10.1257/aer.20230758
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Jan Potters & Martin Sefton & Lise Vesterlund, 2007. "Leading-by-example and signaling in voluntary contribution games: an experimental study," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 33(1), pages 169-182, October.
    2. Anderson, Michael L., 2008. "Multiple Inference and Gender Differences in the Effects of Early Intervention: A Reevaluation of the Abecedarian, Perry Preschool, and Early Training Projects," Journal of the American Statistical Association, American Statistical Association, vol. 103(484), pages 1481-1495.
    3. Green, Edward J & Porter, Robert H, 1984. "Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(1), pages 87-100, January.
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    Cited by:

    1. Uwe Jirjahn, 2025. "Political Spillovers of Worker Representation: With or Without Workplace Democracy?," Research Papers in Economics 2025-02, University of Trier, Department of Economics.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D91 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making
    • J38 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Public Policy
    • J51 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Trade Unions: Objectives, Structure, and Effects
    • O15 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Economic Development: Human Resources; Human Development; Income Distribution; Migration

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