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The Case for the Virtual Strike. An Appraisal of the Italian Proposal

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Author Info
Antonio Nicita ()
Matteo Rizzolli ()

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Abstract

In this paper we outline the economic rationale behind the virtual strike, and workers’ incentives to use this bargaining solution rather than resorting to standard strike action. We show that, from a welfare perspective, a virtual strike always dominates a standard strike and it would be most needed precisely when workers have weaker incentives to adopt it. We then discuss the pros and cons of legally regulating the virtual strike rather than leaving it to self-regulation. Finally, we apply our findings to the analysis of Italy’s draft legislation on virtual strikes

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Paper provided by Department of Economics, University of Siena in its series Department of Economics University of Siena with number 557.

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Date of creation: Feb 2009
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Handle: RePEc:usi:wpaper:557

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Related research
Keywords: Stoppage strike; virtual strike; penal code; labor law and economics;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances
D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy-Making and Implementation
J52 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Dispute Resolution: Strikes, Arbitration, and Mediation
J83 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor Standards - - - Workers' Rights
K31 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Labor Law
M55 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Personnel Economics - - - Labor Contracting Devices

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  1. Francis K. Cheung & Carl Davidson, 1991. "Bargaining Structure and Strike Activity," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 24(2), pages 345-71, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Kuhn, Peter & Gu, Wulong, 1999. "Learning in Sequential Wage Negotiations: Theory and Evidence," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 17(1), pages 109-40, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Reder, Melvin W & Neumann, George R, 1980. "Conflict and Contract: The Case of Strikes," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 88(5), pages 867-86, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Putterman, Louis & Skillman, Gilbert L., 1992. "The role of exit costs in the theory of cooperative teams," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(4), pages 596-618, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Abreu, Dilip, 1988. "On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(2), pages 383-96, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Kennan, John & Wilson, Robert, 1989. "Strategic Bargaining Models and Interpretation of Strike Data," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 4(S), pages S87-130, Supplemen. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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