The role of exit costs in the theory of cooperative teams
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Comparative Economics.
Volume (Year): 16 (1992)
Issue (Month): 4 (December)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622864
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