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Gilbert L. Skillman

Personal Details

First Name:Gilbert
Middle Name:L.
Last Name:Skillman
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:psk87
[This author has chosen not to make the email address public]

Affiliation

Economics Department
Wesleyan University

Middletown, Connecticut (United States)
http://www.wesleyan.edu/econ/
RePEc:edi:edwesus (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Working papers Articles Chapters

Working papers

  1. Gilbert L. Skillman, 2020. "The Nash Bargaining Solution in Labor Market Analysis," Wesleyan Economics Working Papers 2020-005, Wesleyan University, Department of Economics.
  2. Joyce P. Jacobsen & Gilbert L. Skillman, 2012. "Neoclassical Models of Imperfectly Competitive Labor Markets," Wesleyan Economics Working Papers 2012-007, Wesleyan University, Department of Economics.
  3. Dow, G.K. & Skillman, G.L., 1998. "Collective Choice and Control Rights in Firms," Discussion Papers dp98-08, Department of Economics, Simon Fraser University.

Articles

  1. Gilbert L. Skillman, 2022. "The Nash bargaining solution in labor market analysis," Metroeconomica, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 73(3), pages 884-899, July.
  2. Gilbert L. Skillman, 2020. "Marx, Sraffa, and Surplus: Observations Prompted by Garegnani (2018)," Review of Political Economy, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 31(4), pages 602-620, July.
  3. Gilbert L. Skillman, 2020. "Moseley’s “Macro-Monetary†Reading of Capital: Rejoinder and Further Discussion," Review of Radical Political Economics, Union for Radical Political Economics, vol. 52(4), pages 739-754, December.
  4. Gilbert L. Skillman, 2019. "Redistribution and persistent exploitation in an accumulation economy with decreasing marginal impatience," Review of Social Economy, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 77(2), pages 184-207, April.
  5. Skillman, Gilbert L., 2018. "Asset Inequality, Economic Vulnerability And Relational Exploitation," Economics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 34(3), pages 343-368, November.
  6. Gilbert L. Skillman, 2018. "Book Review Essay: Money and Totality: A Macro-Monetary Interpretation of Marx’s Logic in Capital and the End of the “Transformation Problemâ€," Review of Radical Political Economics, Union for Radical Political Economics, vol. 50(3), pages 620-625, September.
  7. Gilbert L. Skillman, 2017. "Marx’s Capital through the lens of Roemer’s General Theory (and vice-versa)," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 49(3), pages 423-443, December.
  8. Gilbert L. Skillman, 2017. "Production Relations in Agrarian Capitalist Development," Review of Radical Political Economics, Union for Radical Political Economics, vol. 49(1), pages 133-147, March.
  9. Gilbert L. Skillman, 2016. "Wealth Inequality and Economic Power: A Sequential Bargaining Analysis," Metroeconomica, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 67(2), pages 291-312, May.
  10. Gilbert L. Skillman, 2016. "Special Issue on ‘Inequality: Causes, Consequences, and Policy Responses’ Introduction," Metroeconomica, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 67(2), pages 204-209, May.
  11. Gilbert Skillman, 2015. "Thirty years after Roemer’s General Theory," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 27(1), pages 3-7, January.
  12. Gilbert Skillman, 2014. "Capitalist exploitation without capitalist production: The consequences of imperfect contracting," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 26(4), pages 629-652, October.
  13. Gilbert L. Skillman, 2013. "The Puzzle of Marx's Missing "Results": A Tale of Two Theories," History of Political Economy, Duke University Press, vol. 45(3), pages 475-504, Fall.
  14. Joyce P Jacobsen & Gilbert L Skillman, 2009. "35th Anniversary Issue of the Eastern Economic Journal," Eastern Economic Journal, Palgrave Macmillan;Eastern Economic Association, vol. 35(1), pages 1-1.
  15. Gregory K. Dow & Gilbert L. Skillman, 2007. "Collective Choice and Control Rights in Firms," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 9(1), pages 107-125, February.
  16. Gilbert L. Skillman, 1997. "Technical Change and the Equilibrium Profit Rate in a Market with Sequential Bargaining," Metroeconomica, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 48(3), pages 238-261, October.
  17. Skillman, Gilbert L., 1995. "Ne Hic Saltaveris: The Marxian Theory of Exploitation After Roemer," Economics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 11(2), pages 309-331, October.
  18. Putterman Louis & Skillman Gilbert L., 1993. "Collectivization and China's Agricultural Crisis," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 530-539, June.
  19. Putterman, Louis & Skillman, Gilbert L., 1992. "The role of exit costs in the theory of cooperative teams," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(4), pages 596-618, December.
  20. Gilbert L. Skillman, 1991. "Efficiency vs. Control: A Strategic Bargaining Analysis of Capitalist Production," Review of Radical Political Economics, Union for Radical Political Economics, vol. 23(1-2), pages 12-21, March.
  21. Skillman, Gil, 1989. "The insider-outsider theory of employment and unemployment : Assar Lindbeck and Dennis J. Snower, (The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1988) pp. xii+285, $27.50," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 365-369, December.
  22. Putterman, Louis & Skillman, Gil Jr., 1988. "The incentive effects of monitoring under alternative compensation schemes," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 6(1), pages 109-119, March.

Chapters

  1. Gilbert L. Skillman, 2013. "Exploitation without subsumption: the scope and limits of proto-industrial exploitation," Chapters, in: Jeannette Wicks-Lim & Robert Pollin (ed.), Capitalism on Trial, chapter 24, Edward Elgar Publishing.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

  1. Dow, G.K. & Skillman, G.L., 1998. "Collective Choice and Control Rights in Firms," Discussion Papers dp98-08, Department of Economics, Simon Fraser University.

    Cited by:

    1. Natália Monteiro & Geoff Stewart, 2015. "Scale, Scope and Survival: A Comparison of Cooperative and Capitalist Modes of Production," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 47(1), pages 91-118, August.
    2. Giuseppe Danese & Luigi Mittone, 2015. "Trust and trustworthiness in experimental organizations," CEEL Working Papers 1501, Cognitive and Experimental Economics Laboratory, Department of Economics, University of Trento, Italia.
    3. Gregory K. Dow, 2000. "Allocating Control Over Firms: Stock Markets Versus Membership Markets," Discussion Papers dp00-03, Department of Economics, Simon Fraser University, revised Feb 2000.
    4. Dow, Gregory K. & Putterman, Louis, 2000. "Why capital suppliers (usually) hire workers: what we know and what we need to know," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 43(3), pages 319-336, November.
    5. Damion Jonathan Bunders & Agnes Akkerman, 2023. "Commitment issues? Analysing the effect of preference deviation and social embeddedness on member commitment to worker cooperatives in the gig economy," Economic and Industrial Democracy, Department of Economic History, Uppsala University, Sweden, vol. 44(4), pages 1007-1026, November.
    6. Gregory K. DOW, 2018. "The Theory Of The Labor-Managed Firm: Past, Present, And Future," Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 89(1), pages 65-86, March.
    7. David Kelsey & Frank Milne, 2010. "Takeovers and cooperatives: governance and stability in non-corporate firms," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 99(3), pages 193-209, April.
    8. Dow,Gregory K., 2019. "The Labor-Managed Firm," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781107589650.

Articles

  1. Skillman, Gilbert L., 2018. "Asset Inequality, Economic Vulnerability And Relational Exploitation," Economics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 34(3), pages 343-368, November.

    Cited by:

    1. Gilbert L. Skillman, 2022. "The Nash bargaining solution in labor market analysis," Metroeconomica, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 73(3), pages 884-899, July.

  2. Gilbert L. Skillman, 2018. "Book Review Essay: Money and Totality: A Macro-Monetary Interpretation of Marx’s Logic in Capital and the End of the “Transformation Problemâ€," Review of Radical Political Economics, Union for Radical Political Economics, vol. 50(3), pages 620-625, September.

    Cited by:

    1. Gilbert L. Skillman, 2020. "Moseley’s “Macro-Monetary†Reading of Capital: Rejoinder and Further Discussion," Review of Radical Political Economics, Union for Radical Political Economics, vol. 52(4), pages 739-754, December.

  3. Gilbert L. Skillman, 2017. "Marx’s Capital through the lens of Roemer’s General Theory (and vice-versa)," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 49(3), pages 423-443, December.

    Cited by:

    1. Jonathan F. Cogliano, 2021. "Marx's Equalized Rate of Exploitation," Working Papers 2021-01, University of Massachusetts Boston, Economics Department.
    2. Giorgos Galanis & Roberto Veneziani & Naoki Yoshihara, 2018. "The dynamics of exploitation and inequality in economies with heterogeneous agents," Working Papers SDES-2018-10, Kochi University of Technology, School of Economics and Management, revised Oct 2018.
    3. Galanis, Giorgos & Veneziani, Roberto & Yoshihara, Naoki, 2018. "The dynamics of inequalities and unequal exchange of labor in intertemporal linear economies," CRETA Online Discussion Paper Series 49, Centre for Research in Economic Theory and its Applications CRETA.
    4. Jonathan F. Cogliano, 2017. "Surplus Value Production and Realization in Marxian Theory - Applications to the U.S., 1987-2015," Working Paper Series 2017-01, Dickinson College, Department of Economics.
    5. Gilbert L. Skillman, 2020. "Moseley’s “Macro-Monetary†Reading of Capital: Rejoinder and Further Discussion," Review of Radical Political Economics, Union for Radical Political Economics, vol. 52(4), pages 739-754, December.
    6. Weikai Chen & Naoki Yoshihara, 2019. "Persistent Exploitation with Intertemporal Reproducible Solution in Pre-industrial Economies," UMASS Amherst Economics Working Papers 2019-10, University of Massachusetts Amherst, Department of Economics.

  4. Gilbert L. Skillman, 2016. "Wealth Inequality and Economic Power: A Sequential Bargaining Analysis," Metroeconomica, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 67(2), pages 291-312, May.

    Cited by:

    1. Gilbert L. Skillman, 2022. "The Nash bargaining solution in labor market analysis," Metroeconomica, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 73(3), pages 884-899, July.

  5. Gilbert Skillman, 2014. "Capitalist exploitation without capitalist production: The consequences of imperfect contracting," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 26(4), pages 629-652, October.

    Cited by:

    1. Jonathan F. Cogliano, 2021. "Marx's Equalized Rate of Exploitation," Working Papers 2021-01, University of Massachusetts Boston, Economics Department.
    2. Naoki Yoshihara, 2017. "A Progress Report On Marxian Economic Theory: On The Controversies In Exploitation Theory Since Okishio (1963)," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 31(5), pages 1421-1448, December.
    3. Jonathan F. Cogliano, 2017. "Surplus Value Production and Realization in Marxian Theory - Applications to the U.S., 1987-2015," Working Paper Series 2017-01, Dickinson College, Department of Economics.

  6. Gregory K. Dow & Gilbert L. Skillman, 2007. "Collective Choice and Control Rights in Firms," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 9(1), pages 107-125, February.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  7. Gilbert L. Skillman, 1997. "Technical Change and the Equilibrium Profit Rate in a Market with Sequential Bargaining," Metroeconomica, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 48(3), pages 238-261, October.

    Cited by:

    1. Petith, Howard, 2008. "Land, technical progress and the falling rate of profit," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 66(3-4), pages 687-702, June.
    2. Howard Petith, 2006. "Land, Technical Progress and the Falling Rate of Profit," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 667.06, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
    3. Junshang Liang, 2021. "The Falling Rate of Profit under Constant Rate of Exploitation: A Generalization," Review of Radical Political Economics, Union for Radical Political Economics, vol. 53(3), pages 501-510, September.
    4. A. J. Julius, 2009. "The Wage–Wage‐ . . . ‐Wage–Profit Relation In A Multisector Bargaining Economy," Metroeconomica, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 60(3), pages 537-559, July.
    5. A. J. Julius, 2005. "The wage-wage-...-wage-profit relation in a multisector bargaining economy," GE, Growth, Math methods 0501003, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. A. J. Julius, 2005. "Steady‐State Growth And Distribution With An Endogenous Direction Of Technical Change," Metroeconomica, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 56(1), pages 101-125, February.

  8. Skillman, Gilbert L., 1995. "Ne Hic Saltaveris: The Marxian Theory of Exploitation After Roemer," Economics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 11(2), pages 309-331, October.

    Cited by:

    1. Yoshihara, Naoki, 2010. "Class and exploitation in general convex cone economies," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 281-296, August.
    2. Jonathan F. Cogliano, 2021. "Marx's Equalized Rate of Exploitation," Working Papers 2021-01, University of Massachusetts Boston, Economics Department.
    3. Yoshihara, Naoki & 吉原, 直毅 & Veneziani, Roberto, 2009. "Exploitation as the Unequal Exchange of Labour: An Axiomatic Approach," CCES Discussion Paper Series 23, Center for Research on Contemporary Economic Systems, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University.
    4. Cogliano, Jonathan F. & Veneziani, Roberto & Yoshihara, Naoki, 2014. "The Dynamics of Exploitation and Class in Accumulation Economies," Discussion Paper Series 621, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
    5. Roberto Veneziani, 2013. "Exploitation, inequality and power," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 25(4), pages 526-545, October.
    6. Cogliano, Jonathan F. & Veneziani, Roberto & Yoshihara, Naoki, 2018. "Exploitation, Skills, and Inequality," Discussion Paper Series 683, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
    7. Roberto Veneziani & Naoki Yoshihara, 2015. "Unequal Exchange, Assets, and Power: Recent Developments in Exploitation Theory," Studies in Choice and Welfare, in: Constanze Binder & Giulio Codognato & Miriam Teschl & Yongsheng Xu (ed.), Individual and Collective Choice and Social Welfare, edition 127, pages 253-287, Springer.
    8. Veneziani, Roberto & Yoshihara, Naoki, 2014. "One million miles to go: taking the axiomatic road to defining exploitation," UMASS Amherst Economics Working Papers 2014-10, University of Massachusetts Amherst, Department of Economics.
    9. Cogliano, Jonathan F. & Veneziani, Roberto & Yoshihara, Naoki, 2022. "The Dynamics of International Exploitation," Discussion Paper Series 736, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
    10. Marc Fleurbaey, 2014. "The facets of exploitation," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 26(4), pages 653-676, October.
    11. Jonathan F. Cogliano, 2017. "Surplus Value Production and Realization in Marxian Theory - Applications to the U.S., 1987-2015," Working Paper Series 2017-01, Dickinson College, Department of Economics.
    12. Gilbert Skillman, 2015. "Thirty years after Roemer’s General Theory," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 27(1), pages 3-7, January.
    13. Veneziani, Roberto, 2007. "Exploitation and time," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 132(1), pages 189-207, January.
    14. Weikai Chen & Naoki Yoshihara, 2019. "Persistent Exploitation with Intertemporal Reproducible Solution in Pre-industrial Economies," UMASS Amherst Economics Working Papers 2019-10, University of Massachusetts Amherst, Department of Economics.
    15. Gilbert L. Skillman, 2017. "Marx’s Capital through the lens of Roemer’s General Theory (and vice-versa)," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 49(3), pages 423-443, December.

  9. Putterman Louis & Skillman Gilbert L., 1993. "Collectivization and China's Agricultural Crisis," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 530-539, June.

    Cited by:

    1. Wang, Hui & Riedinger, Jeffrey & Jin, Songqing, 2015. "Land documents, tenure security and land rental development: Panel evidence from China," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 36(C), pages 220-235.
    2. Riskin, Carl, 1998. "Seven questions about the Chinese famine of 1959-1961," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 9(2), pages 111-124.
    3. Li, Wei & An, Mark & Yang, Dennis, 2001. "China's Great Leap: Forward or Backward? Anatomy of a Central Planning Disaster," CEPR Discussion Papers 2824, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    4. Jin, Songqing & Deininger, Klaus W., 2007. "Land Rental Markets in the Process of Rural Structural Transformation: Productivity and Equity Impacts from China," 2007 Annual Meeting, July 29-August 1, 2007, Portland, Oregon 9932, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
    5. Deininger, Klaus & Jin, Songqing, 2009. "Securing property rights in transition: Lessons from implementation of China's rural land contracting law," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 70(1-2), pages 22-38, May.
    6. Deininger, Klaus & Jin, Songqing & Xia, Fang, 2012. "Moving off the farm: Land institutions to facilitate structural transformation and agricultural productivity growth in China," Policy Research Working Paper Series 5949, The World Bank.
    7. Charness, Gary & Yang, Chun-Lei, 2014. "Starting small toward voluntary formation of efficient large groups in public goods provision," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 119-132.
    8. Lin, Justin Yifu & Yang, Dennis Tao, 1998. "On the causes of China's agricultural crisis and the great leap famine," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 9(2), pages 125-140.
    9. Deininger, Klaus & Jin, Songqing, 2007. "Land rental markets in the process of rural structural transformation : productivity and equity impacts in China," Policy Research Working Paper Series 4454, The World Bank.
    10. Hengzhou Xu & Yihang Zhao & Ronghui Tan & Hongchun Yin, 2017. "Does the Policy of Rural Land Rights Confirmation Promote the Transfer of Farmland in China?," Acta Oeconomica, Akadémiai Kiadó, Hungary, vol. 67(4), pages 643-672, December.

  10. Putterman, Louis & Skillman, Gilbert L., 1992. "The role of exit costs in the theory of cooperative teams," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(4), pages 596-618, December.

    Cited by:

    1. Antonio Nicita & Matteo Rizzolli, 2010. "The case for the virtual strike," Portuguese Economic Journal, Springer;Instituto Superior de Economia e Gestao, vol. 9(1), pages 75-75, April.
    2. Deininger, Klaus, 1995. "Collective agricultural production: A solution for transition economies?," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 23(8), pages 1317-1334, August.
    3. Gaudeul, Alexia & Crosetto, Paolo & Riener, Gerhard, 2017. "Better stuck together or free to go? Of the stability of cooperation when individuals have outside options," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 59(C), pages 99-112.
    4. Riskin, Carl, 1998. "Seven questions about the Chinese famine of 1959-1961," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 9(2), pages 111-124.
    5. Grosskopf Ofer & Medina Barak, 2007. "Rationalizing Drennan: On Irrevocable Offers, Bid Shopping and Binding Range," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 3(2), pages 321-361, August.
    6. Simona Monteleone & Francesco Reito, 2018. "Cooperative firms in hard times," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 51(1), pages 171-179, June.
    7. Dow, Gregory K., 2000. "On the Neutrality of Asset Ownership for Work Incentives," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 581-605, September.
    8. Alexia Gaudeul & Paolo Crosetto & Gerhard Riener, 2015. "Of the stability of partnerships when individuals have outside options, or why allowing exit is inefficient," Jena Economics Research Papers 2015-001, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
    9. Alexia Gaudeul & Paolo Crosetto & Gerhard Riener, 2014. "Fear of being left alone drives inefficient exit from partnerships. An experiment," Jena Economics Research Papers 2014-012, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
    10. Bai, Chong-En & Xu, Cheng-Gang, 2001. "Ownership, incentives and monitoring," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 3750, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    11. Dong, Xiao-yuan & Putterman, Louis, 1997. "Productivity and Organization in China's Rural Industries: A Stochastic Frontier Analysis," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(2), pages 181-201, April.
    12. Gregory K. DOW, 2018. "The Theory Of The Labor-Managed Firm: Past, Present, And Future," Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 89(1), pages 65-86, March.
    13. Chong-en Bai & Chenggang Xu, 1995. "Does Employee Ownership Improve Incentives for Efforts," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 303., Boston College Department of Economics.
    14. Dow,Gregory K., 2019. "The Labor-Managed Firm," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781107589650.
    15. Pablo Blanchard & Gabriel Burdín & Andrés Dean, 2023. "Property Rights and Effort Supply," Documentos de Trabajo (working papers) 23-01, Instituto de Economía - IECON.
    16. Antonio Nicita & Matteo Rizzolli, 2009. "The Case for the Virtual Strike. An Appraisal of the Italian Proposal," Department of Economics University of Siena 557, Department of Economics, University of Siena.
    17. Claudia Keser & Claude Montmarquette, 2011. "Voluntary versus Enforced Team Effort," Games, MDPI, vol. 2(3), pages 1-25, August.

  11. Gilbert L. Skillman, 1991. "Efficiency vs. Control: A Strategic Bargaining Analysis of Capitalist Production," Review of Radical Political Economics, Union for Radical Political Economics, vol. 23(1-2), pages 12-21, March.

    Cited by:

    1. Thomas Palley, 1998. "Macroeconomics with Conflict and Income Distribution," Review of Political Economy, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 10(3), pages 329-342.
    2. Palley, Thomas I. & LaJeunesse, Robert M., 2007. "Social attitudes, labor law, and union organizing: Toward a new economics of union density," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 62(2), pages 237-254, February.

  12. Skillman, Gil, 1989. "The insider-outsider theory of employment and unemployment : Assar Lindbeck and Dennis J. Snower, (The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1988) pp. xii+285, $27.50," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 365-369, December.

    Cited by:

    1. Marco Guerrazzi, 2010. "Nominal Wage Indexation, Quasi‐Equilibria And Real Wage Dynamics," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 62(3), pages 279-294, July.
    2. Víctor Manuel Montuenga Gómez & Andrés E. Romeu Santana & Melchor Fernández Fernández, 2000. "Diferencias salariales y comportamiento no competitivo en el mercado de trabajo en la industria española," Documentos de trabajo - Analise Economica 0009, IDEGA - Instituto Universitario de Estudios e Desenvolvemento de Galicia.

  13. Putterman, Louis & Skillman, Gil Jr., 1988. "The incentive effects of monitoring under alternative compensation schemes," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 6(1), pages 109-119, March.

    Cited by:

    1. Li, Shuhe & Zhang, Weiying, 2001. "Optimal assignment of principalship in teams," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 44(1), pages 105-127, January.
    2. Platteau, Jean-Philippe & Somville, Vincent & Wahhaj, Zaki, 2014. "Elite capture through information distortion: A theoretical essay," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 106(C), pages 250-263.
    3. Zou, L., 1993. "Ownership structure and efficiency : An incentive mechanism approach," Other publications TiSEM a72a05c2-b3f2-47c7-a003-f, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    4. Douglas L. Kruse, 1993. "Does Profit Sharing Affect Productivity?," NBER Working Papers 4542, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Joseph R. Blasi & Douglas L. Kruse & Richard B. Freeman, 2010. "Epilogue (and Prologue)," NBER Chapters, in: Shared Capitalism at Work: Employee Ownership, Profit and Gain Sharing, and Broad-based Stock Options, pages 377-386, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Ugarte, Armando & Oren, Shmuel, 2000. "Coordination of internal supply chains in vertically integrated high-tech manufacturing organizations (HTMOs)," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 67(3), pages 235-252, October.
    7. Zou, Liang, 1992. "Ownership structure and efficiency: An incentive mechanism approach," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(3), pages 399-431, September.
    8. Julia Lane & Robert Feinberg & Harry Broadman, 2002. "Do Labour Strategies Matter? An Analysis of Two Enterprise-Level Data Sets in China," International Journal of the Economics of Business, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 9(2), pages 225-237.
    9. Douglas L. Kruse & Joseph R. Blasi & Rhokeun Park, 2008. "Shared Capitalism in the U.S. Economy? Prevalence, Characteristics, and Employee Views of Financial Participation in Enterprises," NBER Working Papers 14225, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    10. Joseph Blasi & Michael Conte & Douglas Kruse, 1996. "Employee Stock Ownership and Corporate Performance among Public Companies," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 50(1), pages 60-79, October.

Chapters

  1. Gilbert L. Skillman, 2013. "Exploitation without subsumption: the scope and limits of proto-industrial exploitation," Chapters, in: Jeannette Wicks-Lim & Robert Pollin (ed.), Capitalism on Trial, chapter 24, Edward Elgar Publishing.

    Cited by:

    1. Gilbert Skillman, 2014. "Capitalist exploitation without capitalist production: The consequences of imperfect contracting," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 26(4), pages 629-652, October.

More information

Research fields, statistics, top rankings, if available.

Statistics

Access and download statistics for all items

Co-authorship network on CollEc

NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 3 papers announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.
  1. NEP-BEC: Business Economics (1) 2005-09-17
  2. NEP-CDM: Collective Decision-Making (1) 2005-09-17
  3. NEP-COM: Industrial Competition (1) 2020-09-14
  4. NEP-GTH: Game Theory (1) 2020-09-14
  5. NEP-LAB: Labour Economics (1) 2013-07-05
  6. NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (1) 2020-09-14
  7. NEP-ORE: Operations Research (1) 2020-09-14

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