The Case for Virtual Strike.An Appraisal of the Italian Proposal
AbstractIn this paper we outline the economic rationale behind the virtual strike, and workers' incentives to use this bargaining solution rather than resorting to standard strike. We show that, from a welfare perspective, a virtual strike always dominates a standard strike and it would be most needed precisely when workers have weaker incentives to adopt it. We then discuss the pros and cons of legally regulating the virtual strike rather than leaving it to self-regulation. Finally, we apply our findings to the analysis of Italy’s draft legislation on virtual strikes.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Econometica in its series Econometica Working Papers with number wp08.
Date of creation: Mar 2009
Date of revision:
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stoppage strike; virtual strike; penal code; labor law and economics;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances
- D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
- J52 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Dispute Resolution: Strikes, Arbitration, and Mediation
- J83 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor Standards - - - Workers' Rights
- K31 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Labor Law
- M55 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Personnel Economics - - - Labor Contracting Devices
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2009-03-07 (All new papers)
- NEP-LAB-2009-03-07 (Labour Economics)
- NEP-LAW-2009-03-07 (Law & Economics)
- NEP-REG-2009-03-07 (Regulation)
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