Elite Capture Through Information Distortion: A Theoretical Essay
AbstractCommon wisdom as well as sound analytical arguments suggest that stronger punishment of deviant behavior meted out by a principal typically prompts the agents to better conform with his objectives. Addressing the specific issue of donor-beneficiary relationships in the context of participatory development programs, we nevertheless show that greater tolerance on the part of donors may, under certain conditions, favor rather than hurt the interests of the poor. Also, greater uncertainty surrounding the donor's knowledge regarding the poor's preference may have the same paradoxical effect. Critical features of our framework are: (i) communities are heterogeneous and dominated by the local elite in dealing with external agencies, (ii) the elite choose the project proposed to the donor strategically, knowing that the latter has a certain amount of tolerance toward elite capture and an imperfect knowledge of the poor's priorities.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Namur, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 1103.
Length: 22 pages
Date of creation: Jan 2011
Date of revision:
community-driven development; aid effectiveness; elite capture; preference targeting; information distortion.;
Other versions of this item:
- Platteau, Jean-Philippe & Somville, Vincent & Wahhaj, Zaki, 2014. "Elite capture through information distortion: A theoretical essay," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 106(C), pages 250-263.
- Jean-Philippe Platteau & Vincent Somville & Zaki Wahhaj, 2013. "Elite Capture Through Information Distortion: A Theoretical Essay," Studies in Economics 1305, Department of Economics, University of Kent.
- O12 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
- O21 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Development Planning and Policy - - - Planning Models; Planning Policy
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-06-25 (All new papers)
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