The Political Economy of Village Sanitation in South India: Capture or Poor Information?
AbstractDespite efforts to mandate and finance local governments' provision of environmental sanitation services, outcomes remain poor in the villages surveyed in the four South Indian states. The analysis indicates some key issues that appear to hinder improvements in sanitation. Local politicians tend to capture sanitary infrastructure and cleaning services for themselves, while also keeping major village roads reasonably well-served. Their decisions suggest, however, that they neither understand the health benefits of sanitation, nor the negative externalities to their own health if surrounding areas are poorly served. Our findings suggest that improving sanitary outcomes requires disseminating information on the public goods nature of their health benefits, as well as on the local government's responsibilities. It also requires putting public health regulations in place, along with measures to enable accountability in service provision.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by The World Bank in its series Policy Research Working Paper Series with number 4802.
Length: 48 pages
Date of creation: 01 Dec 2008
Date of revision:
access to services; accountability; Accounting; affiliates; agricultural output; agriculture; air; air freight; air transport; Backbone; bank loans; Bank of Tanzania; Banking sector;
Other versions of this item:
- Radu Ban & Monica Das Gupta & Vijayendra Rao, 2010. "The Political Economy of Village Sanitation in South India: Capture or Poor Information?," Journal of Development Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 46(4), pages 685-700.
- NEP-ALL-2009-02-14 (All new papers)
- NEP-DEV-2009-02-14 (Development)
- NEP-POL-2009-02-14 (Positive Political Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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- Pranab Bardhan & Dilip Mookherjee, 2003. "Pro-Poor Targeting and Accountability of Local Governments in West Bengal," Boston University - Department of Economics - The Institute for Economic Development Working Papers Series dp-138, Boston University - Department of Economics.
- Platteau, Jean-Philippe & Somville, Vincent & Wahhaj, Zaki, 2014.
"Elite capture through information distortion: A theoretical essay,"
Journal of Development Economics,
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- Jean-Philippe Platteau & Vincent Somville & Zaki Wahhaj, 2013. "Elite Capture Through Information Distortion: A Theoretical Essay," Studies in Economics 1305, Department of Economics, University of Kent.
- Jean-Philippe Platteau & Vincent Somville & Zaki Wahhaj, 2011. "Elite Capture Through Information Distortion: A Theoretical Essay," Working Papers 1103, University of Namur, Department of Economics.
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