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POLITICAL PARTICIPATION, CLIENTELISM AND TARGETING OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS: Analysis of Survey Results from Rural West Bengal, India

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Author Info

  • Pranab Bardhan

    ()
    (University of California, Berkeley)

  • Sandip Mitra

    ()
    (Jadavpur University)

  • Dilip Mookherjee

    ()
    (Institute for Economic Development, Boston University)

  • Abhirup Sarkar

Abstract

This paper provides evidence concerning political participation (turnout, awareness, attendance at meetings, campaign involvement, voting) and its relation to local governance (targeting of public services) in a developing country, based on a rural household survey in West Bengal, India. With the exception of education and immigrant status, we find that reported participation rates varied remarkably little with socio-economic status. Within villages, benefits disbursed by local governments displayed no relation to wealth, caste, education, gender or political affiliations. In contrast, allocation of benefits across villages by higherlevel governments displayed bias against poor and low caste groups; these biases were larger in villages with more unequal landownership and lower participation rates in village meetings. Political support among voters for the dominant Left party was positively correlated with receipt of recurring benefits and help provided by local governments in times of personal need, but not long-term onetime benefits or local public goods provided.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Boston University - Department of Economics in its series Boston University - Department of Economics - The Institute for Economic Development Working Papers Series with number dp-171.

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Length: 45 pages
Date of creation: Apr 2008
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:bos:iedwpr:dp-171

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Cited by:
  1. Pellicer, Miquel & Wegner, Eva, 2013. "Electoral Rules and Clientelistic Parties: A Regression Discontinuity Approach," International Quarterly Journal of Political Science, now publishers, vol. 8(4), pages 339-371, October.
  2. Jean-Philippe Platteau & Vincent Somville & Zaki Wahhaj, 2013. "Elite Capture Through Information Distortion: A Theoretical Essay," Studies in Economics 1305, Department of Economics, University of Kent.
  3. Dwayne Benjamin & Loren Brandt & John Giles, 2011. "Did Higher Inequality Impede Growth in Rural China?," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 121(557), pages 1281-1309, December.

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