Collective Choice and Control Rights in Firms
AbstractBecause contracts among input suppliers are incomplete, it is necessary to assign rights to determine the policies of the firm. Two leading contenders for such control rights are investors and workers. Large enterprises are generally controlled by capital suppliers or their agents. We trace this pattern to an underlying asymmetry in the characteristics of capital and labor.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Economics, Simon Fraser University in its series Discussion Papers with number dp98-08.
Length: 40 pages
Date of creation: 1998
Date of revision:
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Postal: Department of Economics, Simon Fraser University, 8888 University Drive, Burnaby, BC, V5A 1S6, Canada
Web page: http://www.sfu.ca/economics.html
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Postal: Working Paper Coordinator, Department of Economics, Simon Fraser University, 8888 University Drive, Burnaby, BC, V5A 1S6, Canada
Other versions of this item:
- L21 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Business Objectives of the Firm
- L23 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Organization of Production
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