Ownership positions in large corporations can be traded on anonymous markets, but professional partnerships and worker cooperatives do not permit members to transfer their positions to outsiders without consent from other insiders. These contrasting policies are explained by adverse selection among partners. In such a model total surplus is greater when continuing incumbents, rather than departing memebers, set the terms on which new members can join.
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Paper provided by Department of Economics, Simon Fraser University in its series Discussion Papers with number
dp98-07.
Length: 52 pages Date of creation: 1998 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:sfu:sfudps:dp98-07
Contact details of provider: Postal: Department of Economics, Simon Fraser University, 8888 University Drive, Burnaby, BC, V5A 1S6, Canada Phone: (778)782-3508 Fax: (778)782-5944 Web page: http://www.econ.sfu.ca/ More information through EDIRC
Find related papers by JEL classification: D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Capital and Ownership Structure
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