1. Russell, Raymond, 1985. "Employee ownership and internal governance," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 6(3), pages 217-241, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
2. Dow, G.K., 1998. "Partnership Markets with Adverse Selection," Discussion Papers dp98-07, Department of Economics, Simon Fraser University.
3. Eswaran, Mukesh & Kotwal, Ashok, 1989. "Why Are Capitalists the Bosses?," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 99(394), pages 162-76, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
4. Alchian, Armen A & Demsetz, Harold, 1972. "Production , Information Costs, and Economic Organization," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 62(5), pages 777-95, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, 1971. "Production, Information Costs and Economic Organizations," UCLA Economics Working Papers 10A, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
5. Dow, G & Putterman, L, 1996. "Why Capital (Usually) Hires Labor : An Assessment of Proposed Explanations," Discussion Papers dp97-03, Department of Economics, Simon Fraser University.
6. Klein, Benjamin & Crawford, Robert G & Alchian, Armen A, 1978. "Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 21(2), pages 297-326, October.
7. Jensen, Michael C & Meckling, William H, 1979. "Rights and Production Functions: An Application to Labor-managed Firms and Codetermination," Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 52(4), pages 469-506, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
8. Dow, Gregory K., 1986. "Control rights, competitive markets, and the labor management debate," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 48-61, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
9. Dow, Gregory K. & Putterman, Louis, 2000. "Why capital suppliers (usually) hire workers: what we know and what we need to know," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 43(3), pages 319-336, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
10. Ben-ner, Avner, 1984. "On the stability of the cooperative type of organization," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 8(3), pages 247-260, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
11. Hart, Oliver & Moore, John, 1990. "Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(6), pages 1119-58, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Oliver Hart & John Moore, 1988. "Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm," Working papers 495, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
12. Hart, Oliver & Moore, John, 1994. "A Theory of Debt Based on the Inalienability of Human Capital," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 109(4), pages 841-79, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Oliver Hart & John Moore, 1991. "A Theory of Debt Based on the Inalienability of Human Capital," STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series 233, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
    • Hart, O. & Moore, J., 1991. "A Theory of Debt Based on the Inalienability of Human Capital," Working papers 592, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
    • Oliver Hart & John Moore, 1995. "A Theory of Debt Based on the Inalienability of Human Capital," NBER Working Papers 3906, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
13. Jones, Derek C & Kato, Takao, 1995. "The Productivity Effects of Employee Stock-Ownership Plans and Bonuses: Evidence from Japanese Panel Data," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(3), pages 391-414, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
14. Gintis, Herbert, 1989. "Financial markets and the political structure of the enterprise," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 11(3), pages 311-322, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
15. Ben-Ner, Avner, 1988. "Comparative empirical observations on worker-owned and capitalist firms," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 6(1), pages 7-31, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
16. Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver D, 1986. "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(4), pages 691-719, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver, 1985. "The Cost and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration," CEPR Discussion Papers 70, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    • Oliver Hart & Sanford Grossman, 1985. "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration," Working papers 372, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
17. Putterman, Louis, 1984. "On Some Recent Explanations of Why Capital Hires Labor," Economic Inquiry, Oxford University Press, vol. 22(2), pages 171-87, April.
18. Benham, Lee & Keefer, Philip, 1991. "Voting in Firms: The Role of Agenda Control, Size and Voter Homogeneity," Economic Inquiry, Oxford University Press, vol. 29(4), pages 706-19, October.
19. Holmstrom, Bengt & Milgrom, Paul, 1994. "The Firm as an Incentive System," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(4), pages 972-91, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
20. Patrick Legros & Steven A. Matthews, 1992. "Efficient and Nearly Efficient Partnerships," Discussion Papers 991R, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Legros, Patrick & Matthews, Steven A, 1993. "Efficient and Nearly-Efficient Partnerships," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 60(3), pages 599-611, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
21. repec:fth:simfra:98-07 is not listed on IDEAS
22. Stiglitz, Joseph E & Weiss, Andrew, 1981. "Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 393-410, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
23. Gregory Dow, 1996. "Replicating Walrasian equilibria using markets for membership in labor-managed firms," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 2(1), pages 147-162, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
24. Wadhwani, Sushil & Wall, Martin, 1990. "The Effects of Profit-Sharing on Employment, Wages, Stock Returns and Productivity: Evidence from UK Micro-data," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 100(399), pages 1-17, March.
    Other versions:
    • Wadhwani, S. & Wall, M., 1988. "The Effects Of Profit-Sharing On Employment, Wages, Stock Returns And Productivity: Evidence From Uk Micro-Data," Papers 311, London School of Economics - Centre for Labour Economics.
25. Pencavel, John & Craig, Ben, 1994. "The Empirical Performance of Orthodox Models of the Firm: Conventional Firms and Worker Cooperatives," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(4), pages 718-44, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
26. Michael Kremer, 1997. "Why are Worker Cooperatives So Rare?," NBER Working Papers 6118, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
27. Dow, Gregory K, 1993. "Why Capital Hires Labor: A Bargaining Perspective," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(1), pages 118-34, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
28. Bonin, John P & Jones, Derek C & Putterman, Louis, 1993. "Theoretical and Empirical Studies of Producer Cooperatives: Will Ever the Twain Meet?," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 31(3), pages 1290-320, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
29. Miyazaki, Hajime, 1984. "On Success and Dissolution of the Labor-Managed Firm in the Capitalist Economy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 92(5), pages 909-31, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
30. Estrin, Saul & Jones, Derek C. & Svejnar, Jan, 1987. "The productivity effects of worker participation: Producer cooperatives in western economies," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(1), pages 40-61, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
31. Putterman Louis, 1993. "Ownership and the Nature of the Firm," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 243-263, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
32. Meade, James E, 1972. "The Theory of Labour-Managed Firms and of Profit Sharing," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 82(325), pages 402-28, Supplemen. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
33. Craig, Ben & Pencavel, John, 1992. "The Behavior of Worker Cooperatives: The Plywood Companies of the Pacific Northwest," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(5), pages 1083-105, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
34. Dow, G.K. & Skillman, G.L., 1998. "Collective Choice and Control Rights in Firms," Discussion Papers dp98-08, Department of Economics, Simon Fraser University.
    Other versions:
    • Gregory K. Dow & Gilbert L. Skillman, 2005. "Collective Choice and Control Rights in Firms," Microeconomics 0509003, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    • Gregory K. Dow & Gilbert L. Skillman, 2007. "Collective Choice and Control Rights in Firms," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 9(1), pages 107-125, 02. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
35. Ben-ner, Avner, 1988. "The life cycle of worker-owned firms in market economies : A theoretical analysis," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 10(3), pages 287-313, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
36. Bengt Holmstrom, 1982. "Moral Hazard in Teams," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 13(2), pages 324-340, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
37. Kihlstrom, Richard E & Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1979. "A General Equilibrium Entrepreneurial Theory of Firm Formation Based on Risk Aversion," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 87(4), pages 719-48, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
38. Furubotn, Eirik G, 1976. "The Long-Run Analysis of the Labor-Managed Firm: An Alternative Interpretation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 66(1), pages 104-23, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

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1. Kazuhiko Mikami, 2007. "Enterprise forms, ownership markets, and capital procurement of the firm," Royal Holloway, University of London: Discussion Papers in Economics 07/02, Department of Economics, Royal Holloway University of London, revised Jul 2007. [Downloadable!]
2. Gregory K. Dow, 2000. "The Ultimate Control Group," Discussion Papers dp00-16, Department of Economics, Simon Fraser University, revised Aug 2000. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Dow, Gregory K., 2002. "The ultimate control group," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 39-49, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
3. Hueth, Brent & Marcoul, Philippe & Ginder, Roger, 2005. "Cooperative Formation And Financial Contracting In Agricultural Markets," 2005 Annual meeting, July 24-27, Providence, RI 19324, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association). [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Hueth, Brent & Marcoul, Philippe & Ginder, Roger, 2004. "Cooperative Formation and Financial Contracting in Agricultural Markets," Staff General Research Papers 12193, Iowa State University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
   • Brent Hueth & Philippe Marcoul & Roger G. Ginder, 2004. "Cooperative Formation and Financial Contracting in Agricultural Markets," Center for Agricultural and Rural Development (CARD) Publications 03-wp349, Center for Agricultural and Rural Development (CARD) at Iowa State University. [Downloadable!]
4. Hueth, Brent & Marcoul, Philippe, 2007. "The Cooperative Firm as Monitored Credit," Staff Paper Series 508, University of Wisconsin, Agricultural and Applied Economics. [Downloadable!]