Voting in Firms: The Role of Agenda Control, Size and Voter Homogeneity
AbstractVoting is a common feature of most firms. Unrestricted voting, however, can lead to unstable decision-making. The authors find that firms make trade-offs among collective decision-making, production scale, firm structure, and voter characteristics that are consistent with efforts to economize on the costs of voting. Firm responses include agenda control, restrictions to obtain a homogeneous voting population, and limits on firm size. The authors consider three long-surviving producer cooperatives, representing extreme cases of collective decision-making, and find that their organization is sensitive to the costs of voting and to the employment of mechanisms to constrain those costs. Copyright 1991 by Oxford University Press.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Western Economic Association International in its journal Economic Inquiry.
Volume (Year): 29 (1991)
Issue (Month): 4 (October)
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- Gregory Dow, 1996. "Replicating Walrasian equilibria using markets for membership in labor-managed firms," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 2(1), pages 147-162, December.
- Kevin Roberts, 2013. "The Dynamics of Delegated Decision Making," Economics Series Working Papers 678, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
- Dow, Gregory K. & Putterman, Louis, 2000. "Why capital suppliers (usually) hire workers: what we know and what we need to know," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 43(3), pages 319-336, November.
- Gregory K. Dow, 2000.
"Allocating Control Over Firms: Stock Markets Versus Membership Markets,"
dp00-03, Department of Economics, Simon Fraser University, revised Feb 2000.
- Gregory Dow, 2001. "Allocating Control over Firms: Stock Markets versus Membership Markets," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer, vol. 18(2), pages 201-218, March.
- Michael Kremer, 1997. "Why are Worker Cooperatives So Rare?," NBER Working Papers 6118, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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