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Empleo, remuneraciones e inversión en cooperativas de trabajadores y empresas convencionales: nueva evidencia para Uruguay

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Author Info

  • Guillermo Alves

    ()
    (Universidad de la República (Uruguay). Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y de Administración. Instituto de Economía)

  • Gabriel Burdin

    ()
    (Universidad de la República (Uruguay). Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y de Administración. Instituto de Economía)

  • Paula Carrasco

    ()
    (Universidad de la República (Uruguay). Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y de Administración. Instituto de Economía)

  • Andrés Dean

    ()
    (Universidad de la República (Uruguay). Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y de Administración. Instituto de Economía)

  • Andrés Rius

    ()
    (Universidad de la República (Uruguay). Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y de Administración. Instituto de Economía)

Abstract

In this work we present the results of a recent survey thar covered the whole universe of Worker Cooperatives in Uruguay. In order to be able to evaluate the comparative performance of Worker Cooperatives the survey covered also a control group of conventional firms with similar size and sector composition. In line with previous empirical research and theoretical literature, we report significant differences between the two groups of firms in several aspects of economic behavior. Cooperatives in Uruguay exhibit lower variation in wage and employment levels over time and lower dispersion of wages among workers of the same firm. They have a lower proportion of workers performing supervision tasks, lower investment rates and are less capital-intensive than the control group. Within the cooperative universe, lower investment rates and capital intensity are positively related with worker-owners being older and with the inexistence of membership markets, or more generally, of any form of individually specified property rights. On the other hand, we report no relevant differences in innovation activities and propensity to cooperate with other firms. These results are discussed in the context of the existent theoretical and empirical literature about the relative economic performance of Worker Cooperatives.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Instituto de Economía - IECON in its series Documentos de Trabajo (working papers) with number 12-14.

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Length: 59 pages
Date of creation: Oct 2012
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ulr:wpaper:dt-14-12

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Keywords: Worker cooperatives; Capitalist firms; Comparative analysis; Investment; Employment.;

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References

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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Andrés Dean, 2014. "¿Las cooperativas de trabajadores degeneran?," Documentos de Trabajo (working papers), Instituto de Economía - IECON 14-01, Instituto de Economía - IECON.
  2. Gabriel Burdin, 2012. "Does workers’ control affect firm survival? Evidence from Uruguay," Documentos de Trabajo (working papers), Instituto de Economía - IECON 12-06, Instituto de Economía - IECON.
  3. Gabriel Burdín, 2013. "Equality under threat by the talented: evidence from worker-managed firms," Documentos de Trabajo (working papers), Instituto de Economía - IECON 13-12, Instituto de Economía - IECON.
  4. Gabriel Burdin, 2014. "Are Worker-Managed Firms More Likely to Fail than Conventional Enterprises? Evidence from Uruguay," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 67(1), pages 202-238, January.
  5. Sebastián Berazategui & Emilio Landinelli & Daniel Ramírez, 2013. "Una comparación del comportamiento innovador entre Cooperativas de Trabajo y Empresas Capitalistas en Uruguay," Documentos de Trabajo basados en Monografias (students working papers), Instituto de Economía - IECON 13-02, Instituto de Economía - IECON.
  6. Burdín, Gabriel, 2013. "Are Worker-Managed Firms Really More Likely to Fail?," IZA Discussion Papers 7412, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).

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