Why Capital (Usually) Hires Labor : An Assessment of Proposed Explanations
AbstractEnterprises owned or run by workers are probably as old as capitalism itself, but they have never occfupied more than a small sector of any developed market economy. In this paper, we ask why this is so.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Economics, Simon Fraser University in its series Discussion Papers with number dp97-03.
Length: 61 pages
Date of creation: 1996
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Postal: Department of Economics, Simon Fraser University, 8888 University Drive, Burnaby, BC, V5A 1S6, Canada
Web page: http://www.sfu.ca/economics.html
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Postal: Working Paper Coordinator, Department of Economics, Simon Fraser University, 8888 University Drive, Burnaby, BC, V5A 1S6, Canada
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