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Why Capital Hires Labor: A Bargaining Perspective

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Author Info
Dow, Gregory K

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Abstract

Organizational forms often serve as vehicles for the appropriation of quasi-rent. Capitalist firms typically emerge when production requires noncontractible investments in specific physical assets because worker control would divert quasi-rents away from ass et owners ex post. Conversely, labor-managed firms tend to emerge in niches requiring specialized human capital but general-purpose physi cal assets. A key result is that capitalist firms can persist in competitive markets even when labor-managed firms would yield a larg er total surplus. Copyright 1993 by American Economic Association.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by American Economic Association in its journal American Economic Review.

Volume (Year): 83 (1993)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
Pages: 118-34
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Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:83:y:1993:i:1:p:118-34

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  4. Gregory Dow, 1996. "Replicating Walrasian equilibria using markets for membership in labor-managed firms," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 2(1), pages 147-162, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Ricardo J. Caballero & Mohamad L. Hammour, 1996. "The Macroeconomics of Specificity," NBER Working Papers 5757, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  9. Alper Duman, 2009. "Comparative Analysis of Organizational Forms in the Software Industry and Legal Services," Working Papers 0903, Izmir University of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  10. Gary Gorton & Frank Schmid, 2002. "Class struggle inside the firm: a study of German codetermination," Working Papers 2000-025, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. [Downloadable!]
  11. A. Cassoni & G. Fachola & G. Labadie, 2001. "The impact of unions on the economic performance of firms," Documentos de Trabajo (working papers) 1501, Department of Economics - dECON. [Downloadable!]
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