Virtual vs. Standard Strike: An Experiment
AbstractIn this paper we compare - in the laboratory - stoppage and virtual strike. Our experiment confirms that higher wages offered by an employer lead to considerably more costly effort provision. The number of strikes, the level of efforts and average total payoffs are higher under virtual strike than under standard strike. However, when standard strike is associated with reciprocal externalities, it induces higher effort levels, higher payoffs and an extremely reduced number of strikes than virtual strike. It is unclear whether this behavior re?ects reciprocity or other forms of social preferences. However our results might explain why standard strikes rather than virtual ones are generally adopted by workers.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Siena in its series Labsi Experimental Economics Laboratory University of Siena with number 026.
Date of creation: Jun 2009
Date of revision:
virtual strike; cooperation; reciprocity; fairness; experiments;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
- D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances
- D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
- J52 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Dispute Resolution: Strikes, Arbitration, and Mediation
- K31 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Labor Law
- M55 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Personnel Economics - - - Labor Contracting Devices
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2009-09-05 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBE-2009-09-05 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-EXP-2009-09-05 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-HPE-2009-09-05 (History & Philosophy of Economics)
- NEP-LAB-2009-09-05 (Labour Economics)
- NEP-SOC-2009-09-05 (Social Norms & Social Capital)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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"Fairness and Contract Design,"
Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems
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University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series
qt8rp6b18c, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara.
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- Antonio Nicita & Matteo Rizzolli, 2010.
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- Gary Charness & Peter Kuhn, 2007. "Does Pay Inequality Affect Worker Effort? Experimental Evidence," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 25, pages 693-723.
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