Robust Learning Stability with Operational Monetary Policy Rules
AbstractWe consider “robust stability” of a rational expectations equilibrium, which we define as stability under discounted (constant gain) least-squares learning, for a range of gain parameters. We find that for operational forms of policy rules, i.e. rules that do not depend on contemporaneous values of endogenous aggregate variables, many interest-rate rules do not exhibit robust stability. We consider a variety of interest-rate rules, including instrument rules, optimal reaction functions under discretion or commitment, and rules that approximate optimal policy under commitment. For some reaction functions we allow for an interest-rate stabilization motive in the policy objective. The expectations-based rules proposed in Evans and Honkapohja (2003, 2006) deliver robust learning stability. In contrast, many proposed alternatives become unstable under learning even at small values of the gain parameter.
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Commitment; interest-rate setting; adaptive learning; stability; determinacy.;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
- E31 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Price Level; Inflation; Deflation
- D84 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Expectations; Speculations
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- Bullard, James & Mitra, Kaushik, 2002.
"Learning about monetary policy rules,"
Journal of Monetary Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 49(6), pages 1105-1129, September.
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