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Why tenure? Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Cater, Bruce
Lew, Byron
Pivato, Marcus
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Academic research is a public good whose production is supported by the tuition-paying students that a faculty's research accomplishments attract. A professor's spot contribution to the university's revenues thus depends not on her spot research production, but rather on her cumulative research record. We show that a profit-maximizing university will apply a `high' minimum retention standard to the production of a junior professor who has no record of past research, but a `zero' retention standard to the spot production of a more senior professor whose background includes accomplishments sufficient to have cleared the `high' probationary hurdle.
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Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number
14823.
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Date of creation: 17 Jan 2009Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:14823Contact details of provider: Postal: Schackstr. 4, D-80539 Munich, Germany Phone: +49-(0)89-2180-2219 Fax: +49-(0)89-2180-3900 Web page: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de More information through EDIRC
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Keywords: academic tenure ; labour contract ; up-or-out ; Other versions of this item:
Find related papers by JEL classification: J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts J31 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports :
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.: Holmstrom, Bengt & Milgrom, Paul, 1987.
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[Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Levin, Sharon G & Stephan, Paula E, 1991.
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Carmichael, H Lorne, 1988.
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Waldman, Michael, 1990.
"Up-or-Out Contracts: A Signaling Perspective ,"
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[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: MacLeod, W Bentley & Malcomson, James M, 1989.
"Implicit Contracts, Incentive Compatibility, and Involuntary Unemployment ,"
Econometrica ,
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[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Smith Freeman, 1977.
"Wage Trends as Performance Displays Productive Potential: A Model and Application to Academic Early Retirement ,"
Bell Journal of Economics ,
The RAND Corporation, vol. 8(2), pages 419-443, Autumn.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Siow, Aloysius, 1998.
"Tenure and Other Unusual Personnel Practices in Academia ,"
Journal of Law, Economics and Organization ,
Oxford University Press, vol. 14(1), pages 152-73, April.
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