Tenure and Other Unusual Personnel Practices in Academia
AbstractModern universities sell (teach) knowledge of social and scientific advances. In carrying out their objective, universities have to address three related constraints: the problem of specialization as knowledge expands, research obsolescence, and the informational asymmetries between a university and its faculty. This article explores how distinctive features of academia, including peer review, tenure, up or out rules, the negative seniority wage premium, the role of outside offers, and the proliferation of academic journals alleviate these constraints. This article also studies how these issues affect the evolution of the organization of academia in North America. Copyright 1998 by Oxford University Press.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Oxford University Press in its journal Journal of Law, Economics and Organization.
Volume (Year): 14 (1998)
Issue (Month): 1 (April)
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