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Optimal voting rules for two-member tenure committees

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  • Ian Ayres
  • Colin Rowat

    ()

  • Nasser Zakariya

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s00355-010-0477-2
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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal Social Choice and Welfare.

Volume (Year): 36 (2011)
Issue (Month): 2 (February)
Pages: 323-354

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Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:36:y:2011:i:2:p:323-354

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References

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  1. Mattias Polborn, 2000. "Endogenous Majority Rules with Changing Preferences," UWO Department of Economics Working Papers 200012, University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics.
  2. Bernheim, B Douglas & Whinston, Michael D, 1998. "Incomplete Contracts and Strategic Ambiguity," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(4), pages 902-32, September.
  3. Michael S. McPherson & Morton Owen Schapiro, 1999. "Tenure Issues in Higher Education," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 13(1), pages 85-98, Winter.
  4. Jens Prüfer & Uwe Walz, 2013. "Academic faculty governance and recruitment decisions," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 155(3), pages 507-529, June.
  5. Ian Ayres & Colin Rowat & Nasser Zakariya, 2004. "Optimal two stage committee voting rules," Game Theory and Information 0412006, EconWPA.
  6. Peleg, Bezalel, 2002. "Game-theoretic analysis of voting in committees," Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, in: K. J. Arrow & A. K. Sen & K. Suzumura (ed.), Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 8, pages 395-423 Elsevier.
  7. Zhiqi Chen & J. Stephen Ferris, 1995. "A Theory of Tenure for the Teaching University," Carleton Economic Papers 95-12, Carleton University, Department of Economics, revised Jan 1999.
  8. Ronald G. Ehrenberg & Paul J. Pieper & Rachel A. Willis, 1998. "Do Economics Departments With Lower Tenure Probabilities Pay Higher Faculty Salaries?," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 80(4), pages 503-512, November.
  9. M. L. Weitzman, 1978. "Optimal Search for the Best Alternative," Working papers 214, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  10. Cox, John C. & Ross, Stephen A. & Rubinstein, Mark, 1979. "Option pricing: A simplified approach," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 7(3), pages 229-263, September.
  11. Siow, Aloysius, 1998. "Tenure and Other Unusual Personnel Practices in Academia," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 14(1), pages 152-73, April.
  12. Kubler, Felix & Schmedders, Karl, 2010. "Competitive equilibria in semi-algebraic economies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(1), pages 301-330, January.
  13. Scott E. Masten, 2006. "Authority and Commitment: Why Universities, Like Legislatures, Are Not Organized as Firms," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 15(3), pages 649-684, 09.
  14. Jean Tirole, 1999. "Incomplete Contracts: Where Do We Stand?," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 67(4), pages 741-782, July.
  15. Moulin, Herve, 1994. "Social choice," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 31, pages 1091-1125 Elsevier.
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