Endogenous Majority Rules with Changing Preferences
AbstractThis paper provides a new explanation why several US states have implemented supermajority requirements for tax increases. We model a dynamic and stochastic OLG economy where individual preferences depend on age and change over time in a systematic way. In this setting, we show that the first population of voters will choose a supermajority rule in order to influence the outcomes of future elections. We explore the robustness of the basic model and also find some empirical support for predictions derived from the model.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics in its series UWO Department of Economics Working Papers with number 200012.
Date of creation: 2000
Date of revision:
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