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When the Powerful Drag Their Feet

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Abstract

We examine the timing of group decisions that are taken by weighted voting. Decision-making is in two stages. In the second stage, players vote on a policy restriction. In the first stage, players vote to determine the timing of the second-stage decision: “early”, before players’ types are revealed, or “late”. Players differ in both size and voting power. We show that players with greater power tend to prefer a late vote, whereas less powerful players tend to want to vote early. By contrast, large players tend to prefer an early vote and small players a late vote. We present evidence from the literatures on corporate governance, international relations, European Union governance, and oil extraction. We examine an extension in which players choose the qualified majority threshold besides the timing of the second-stage vote.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Department of Economics, University of Victoria in its series Department Discussion Papers with number 0703.

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Length: 47 pages
Date of creation: 04 Sep 2007
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:vic:vicddp:0703

Note: ISSN 1914-2838
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Keywords: Timing of decisions; strategic delay; committee decisions; weighted voting; multilateralism;

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Cited by:
  1. Attanasi, Giuseppe & Corazzini, Luca & Passarelli, Francesco, 2010. "Voting as a Lottery," TSE Working Papers, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE) 09-116, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), revised Nov 2010.

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