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Labour market signalling and job turnover revisited

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  • Banerjee, Dyuti S.
  • Gaston, Noel

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  • Banerjee, Dyuti S. & Gaston, Noel, 2004. "Labour market signalling and job turnover revisited," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(5), pages 599-622, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:labeco:v:11:y:2004:i:5:p:599-622
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Michael Waldman, 1984. "Job Assignments, Signalling, and Efficiency," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 15(2), pages 255-267, Summer.
    2. Bruce C. Greenwald, 1986. "Adverse Selection in the Labour Market," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 53(3), pages 325-347.
    3. Devine, Theresa J. & Kiefer, Nicolas M., 1991. "Empirical Labor Economics: The Search Approach," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780195059366, Decembrie.
    4. George Baker & Michael Gibbs & Bengt Holmstrom, 1994. "The Wage Policy of a Firm," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 109(4), pages 921-955.
    5. Ransom, Michael R, 1993. "Seniority and Monopsony in the Academic Labor Market," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(1), pages 221-233, March.
    6. Waldman, Michael, 1990. "Up-or-Out Contracts: A Signaling Perspective," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 8(2), pages 230-250, April.
    7. Siow, Aloysius, 1998. "Tenure and Other Unusual Personnel Practices in Academia," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 14(1), pages 152-173, April.
    8. George Baker & Michael Gibbs & Bengt Holmstrom, 1994. "The Internal Economics of the Firm: Evidence from Personnel Data," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 109(4), pages 881-919.
    9. Farber, Henry S., 1999. "Mobility and stability: The dynamics of job change in labor markets," Handbook of Labor Economics, in: O. Ashenfelter & D. Card (ed.), Handbook of Labor Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 37, pages 2439-2483, Elsevier.
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    Cited by:

    1. Dato, Simon & Grunewald, Andreas & Kräkel, Matthias & Müller, Daniel, 2016. "Asymmetric employer information, promotions, and the wage policy of firms," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 100(C), pages 273-300.
    2. Xiaolin Xing & Zhenlin Yang, 2005. "Determinants of Job Turnover Intentions : Evidence from Singapore," Labor Economics Working Papers 22588, East Asian Bureau of Economic Research.
    3. Ricardo Mamede, 2009. "Toward an integrated approach to industry dynamics and labor mobility," Industrial and Corporate Change, Oxford University Press and the Associazione ICC, vol. 18(1), pages 139-163, February.
    4. Ilias Livanos & Imanol Núñez, 2012. "The effect of higher education on the gender wage gap," International Journal of Education Economics and Development, Inderscience Enterprises Ltd, vol. 3(1), pages 33-47.
    5. Timothy J. Perri, 2005. "Raiding and Signaling in the Academic Labor Market," Working Papers 05-21, Department of Economics, Appalachian State University.
    6. Kim, Jin-Hyuk, 2007. "Employee Poaching, Predatory Hiring, and Covenants Not to Compete," MPRA Paper 83254, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    7. Philip Stevens, 2005. "The job satisfaction of English academics and their intentions to quit academe," Labor and Demography 0512005, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    8. John G. Sessions & John D. Skåtun, 2022. "Luck in a Flat Hierarchy: Wages, Bonuses and Noise," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 98(323), pages 373-391, December.
    9. Romel Mostafa & Steven Klepper, 2018. "Industrial Development Through Tacit Knowledge Seeding: Evidence from the Bangladesh Garment Industry," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 64(2), pages 613-632, February.

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