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Raiding and Signaling in the Academic Labor Market

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Author Info
Timothy J. Perri

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Abstract

Publications signal a professor’s productivity and may lead to raids by other universities. A raided professor learns the value of non-wage benefits at a raiding university, and will quit only if benefits elsewhere are relatively high. The social value of these benefits suggests research may be efficient even in the absence of a direct social value from research. Other results are: in some cases, a school may preempt signaling by paying a higher wage, but it will only do so when signaling is inefficient; and it is inefficient for a university to commit to not match outside offers.

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File URL: http://econ.appstate.edu/RePEc/pdf/wp0521.pdf
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Paper provided by Department of Economics, Appalachian State University in its series Working Papers with number 05-21.

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Date of creation: 2005
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Handle: RePEc:apl:wpaper:05-21

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Web page: http://www.business.appstate.edu/departments/economics/
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References listed on IDEAS
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  1. Riley, John G, 1979. "Informational Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(2), pages 331-59, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Michael Waldman, 1983. "Job Assignments, Signalling nad Efficiency," UCLA Economics Working Papers 286, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Limor Golan, 2005. "Counteroffers and Efficiency in Labor Markets with Asymmetric Information," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 23(2), pages 373-372, April. [Downloadable!]
  4. Laband, David N, 1986. "Article Popularity," Economic Inquiry, Oxford University Press, vol. 24(1), pages 173-80, January.
  5. John M. Barron & Mark C. Berger & Dan A. Black, 2006. "Selective Counteroffers," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 24(3), pages 385-410, July. [Downloadable!]
  6. Ishida, Junichiro, 2004. "Signaling and strategically delayed promotion," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(6), pages 687-700, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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