Raiding and Signaling in the Academic Labor Market
AbstractPublications signal a professor’s productivity and may lead to raids by other universities. A raided professor learns the value of non-wage benefits at a raiding university, and will quit only if benefits elsewhere are relatively high. The social value of these benefits suggests research may be efficient even in the absence of a direct social value from research. Other results are: in some cases, a school may preempt signaling by paying a higher wage, but it will only do so when signaling is inefficient; and it is inefficient for a university to commit to not match outside offers.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Economics, Appalachian State University in its series Working Papers with number 05-21.
Date of creation: 2005
Date of revision:
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Web page: http://www.business.appstate.edu/departments/economics/
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This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2005-10-15 (All new papers)
- NEP-LAB-2005-10-15 (Labour Economics)
- NEP-SOG-2005-10-15 (Sociology of Economics)
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