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Wage dynamics and promotions inside and between firms

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  • Bas Klaauw

    ()

  • António Dias da Silva

Abstract

We focus on the dynamic relation between wage increases, promotions and job changes. We relate our empirical analyses to the theoretical model of Gibbons and Waldman (1999). In the empirical analyses we use the Portuguese matched employer-employee data Quadros de Pessoal. We conclude from finding significant serial correlation in wage increases and promotion rates that employer learning about the worker's ability might be important. Furthermore, we find that the Portuguese labor market is not competitive. Finally, we argue that employer-reported promotion relate to a large extent to wage increases rather than changes in job tasks and complexity.

(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal Journal of Population Economics.

Volume (Year): 24 (2011)
Issue (Month): 4 (October)
Pages: 1513-1548

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Handle: RePEc:spr:jopoec:v:24:y:2011:i:4:p:1513-1548

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Related research

Keywords: Learning; Competition; Matched employer–employee data; M5; J6; L2;

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References

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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Michael Waldman, 2012. "Theory and Evidence in Internal LaborMarkets
    [The Handbook of Organizational Economics]
    ," Introductory Chapters, Princeton University Press.
  2. Kauhanen, Antti & Napari, Sami, 2011. "Career and Wage Dynamics: Evidence from Linked Employer-Employee Data," Discussion Papers 1244, The Research Institute of the Finnish Economy.
  3. Machado, C. Sofia & Portela, Miguel, 2013. "Age and Opportunities for Promotion," IZA Discussion Papers 7784, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  4. Kazuaki Okamura, 2011. "The Signalling Role of Promotion in Japan," Discussion Papers 1112, Graduate School of Economics, Kobe University.
  5. Frederiksen, Anders & Halliday, Timothy J. & Koch, Alexander K., 2010. "What Do We Work For? An Anatomy of Pre- and Post-Tax Earnings Growth," IZA Discussion Papers 5298, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  6. Frederiksen, Anders & Halliday, Timothy J. & Koch, Alexander K., 2010. "Within- and Cross-Firm Mobility and Earnings Growth," IZA Discussion Papers 5163, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).

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