Optimal assignment of durable objects to successive agents
AbstractThis paper analyzes the assignment of durable objects to successive generations of agents who live for two periods. The optimal assignment rule is stationary, favors old agents and is determined by a selectivity function, which satisfies an iterative functional differential equation. More patient social planners are more selective, as are social planners facing distributions of types with higher probabilities for higher types. The paper also characterizes optimal assignment rules when monetary transfers are allowed and agents face a recovery cost, when multiple agents enter society, and when agents can invest to improve their types. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2012
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Economic Theory.
Volume (Year): 51 (2012)
Issue (Month): 1 (September)
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Web page: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00199/index.htm
Other versions of this item:
- Francis Bloch & Nicolas Houy, 2009. "Optimal Assignment of Durable Objects to Successive Agents," Working Papers hal-00435385, HAL.
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
- M51 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Personnel Economics - - - Firm Employment Decisions; Promotions
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