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A note on the Exclusion Principle

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Author Info
Bertoletti, Paolo

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Abstract

According to the so-called Exclusion Principle (introduced by Baye et alii, 1993), it might be profitable for the seller to reduce the number of fully-informed potential bidders in an all-pay auction. We show that it does not apply if the seller regards the bidders’ private valuations as belonging to the class of identical and independent distributions with a monotonic hazard rate.

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File URL: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1085/
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 1085.

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Date of creation: May 2006
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Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:1085

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Related research
Keywords: all-pay auctions Exclusion Principle monotonic hazard rate economic theory of lobbying

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information
D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions
D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Domenico Menicucci, 2006. "Banning Bidders from All-pay Auctions," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 29(1), pages 89-94, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Moldovanu, Benny & Sela, Aner, 1999. "The Optimal Allocation of Prizes in Contests," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 99-75, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim & Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim. [Downloadable!]
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(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Bertoletti, Paolo, 2006. "On the reserve price in all-pay auctions with complete information and lobbying games," MPRA Paper 1083, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
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