All-Pay Auctions with Extra Prize: A Partial Exclusion Principle
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Cited by:
- Dahm, Matthias & Esteve-González, Patricia, 2018.
"Affirmative action through extra prizes,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 153(C), pages 123-142.
- Dahm, Matthias & Esteve, Patrícia,, 2013. "Affirmative Action through Extra Prizes," Working Papers 2072/222197, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics.
- Matthias Dahm & Patricia Esteve, 2014. "Affirmative Action through Extra Prizes," Discussion Papers 2014-08, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
- Alexander Matros & David Michael Rietzke, 2017. "Contests on Networks," Working Papers 156630581, Lancaster University Management School, Economics Department.
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More about this item
Keywords
Asymmetric contests; multi-prize contests; equality of opportunity; affirmative action; discrimination; prize structure; exclusion principle;All these keywords.
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-EXP-2017-02-05 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-MIC-2017-02-05 (Microeconomics)
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