Multiple-Prize Contests - The Optimal Allocation Of Prizes
AbstractMultiple-prize contests are important in various fields of economics ranging from rent seeking over labour economics, patent and R&D races to tendering for (governmental) projects. Hence it is crucial to understand the incentive effects of multiple prizes on effort investment. This survey attempts to outline, compare and evaluate the results from the literature. While a first prize always results in a positive incentive to invest effort, second and later prizes lead to ambiguous effects. Depending on the objective function, the characteristics of the individuals and the type of contest a different prize allocation is optimal. Copyright � 2008 The Authors. Journal compilation � 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
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Volume (Year): 23 (2009)
Issue (Month): 1 (02)
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