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Why the Olympics have three prizes and not just one

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Author Info
Pavlo Blavatskyy
Abstract

There are at least two reasons why multiple prizes can be optimal in symmetric imperfectly discriminating contests. First, the introduction of multiple prizes reduces the standard deviation of contestants’ effort in asymmetric equilibria, when the majority of contestants actively participate in competition. Second, the introduction of multiple prizes may increase the aggregate (average) effort contributed in the contest. When more of a total prize fund is shifted away from the first prize, on the one hand, the active contestants obtain an incentive to reduce their individual effort, but, on the other hand, the number of active contestants may increase. Therefore, the aggregate (average) effort may increase when the number of active contestants in equilibrium increases.

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Paper provided by Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - IEW in its series IEW - Working Papers with number iewwp200.

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Handle: RePEc:zur:iewwpx:200

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Keywords: symmetric contest; imperfectly discriminating contest; logit; asymmetric equilibria; prize structure; sport;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
L83 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Sports; Gambling; Recreation; Tourism

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  2. Fehr, Ernst & Fischbacher, Urs & von Rosenbladt, Bernhard & Schupp, Jürgen & Wagner, Gert G., 2003. "A Nation-Wide Laboratory: Examining Trust and Trustworthiness by Integrating Behavioral Experiments into Representative Surveys," IZA Discussion Papers 715, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
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  3. Foellmi, Reto & Zweimuller, Josef, 2004. "Inequality, market power, and product diversity," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 82(1), pages 139-145, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  4. Alois Stutzer & Bruno S. Frey, . "Does Marriage Make People Happy, Or Do Happy People Get Married?," IEW - Working Papers iewwp143, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - IEW. [Downloadable!]
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  5. Lorenz Goette & David Huffman & Ernst Fehr, . "Loss Aversion and Labor Supply," IEW - Working Papers iewwp178, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - IEW. [Downloadable!]
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  6. Bruno S. Frey & Simon Luechinger & Alois Stutzer, . "Valuing Public Goods: The Life Satisfaction Approach," IEW - Working Papers iewwp184, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - IEW. [Downloadable!]
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  7. Hens,Thorsten & Herings,P. Jean-Jacques & Predtetchinskii,Arkadi, 2003. "Limits to Arbitrage when Market Participation Is Restricted," Research Memoranda 061, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization. [Downloadable!]
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  11. Steffen Huck & Michael Kosfeld, 2007. "The Dynamics of Neighbourhood Watch and Norm Enforcement," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 117(516), pages 270-286, 01. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  12. Frey, Bruno S. & Meier, Stephan, 2006. "The Economics of Museums," Handbook of the Economics of Art and Culture, Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  13. Alois Stutzer & Bruno S. Frey, 2008. "Stress that Doesn't Pay: The Commuting Paradox," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 110(2), pages 339-366, 06. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  14. Igor Evstigneev & Thorsten Hens & Klaus Reiner Schenk-Hoppé, 2003. "Evolutionary Stable Stock Markets," Discussion Papers 03-39, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  15. Perez-Castrillo, J David & Verdier, Thierry, 1992. " A General Analysis of Rent-Seeking Games," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 73(3), pages 335-50, April.
  16. Stephan Meier & Bruno Frey, 2004. "Do business students make good citizens?," International Journal of the Economics of Business, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 11(2), pages 141-163, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  17. Bruno S. Frey & Alois Stutzer, . "Testing Theories of Happiness," IEW - Working Papers iewwp147, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - IEW. [Downloadable!]
  18. Aleksander Berentsen & Gabriele Camera & Christopher Waller, . "The Distribution of Money and Prices in an Equilibrium with Lotteries," IEW - Working Papers iewwp174, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - IEW. [Downloadable!]
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  19. Foellmi, Reto & Oechslin, Manuel, 2007. "Who gains from non-collusive corruption?," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 82(1), pages 95-119, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Steffen Huck & Michael Kosfeld, . "The Dynamics of Neighbourhood Watch and Norm Enforcement," IEW - Working Papers iewwp199, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - IEW. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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