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Competition among volunteers

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  • Cugno, Franco
  • Ferrero, Mario

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal European Journal of Political Economy.

Volume (Year): 20 (2004)
Issue (Month): 3 (September)
Pages: 637-654

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Handle: RePEc:eee:poleco:v:20:y:2004:i:3:p:637-654

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505544

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References

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  1. Arye L. Hillman & John G. Riley, 1987. "Politically Contestable Rents and Transfers," UCLA Economics Working Papers 452, UCLA Department of Economics.
  2. Sherwin Rosen, 1985. "Prizes and Incentives in Elimination Tournaments," NBER Working Papers 1668, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  3. Appelbaum, Elie & Katz, Eliakim, 1987. "Seeking Rents by Setting Rents: The Political Economy of Rent Seeking," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 97(387), pages 685-99, September.
  4. Appelbaum, Elie & Katz, Eliakim, 1986. "Rent seeking and entry," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 20(3), pages 207-212.
  5. Barham, Vicky & Boadway, Robin & Marchand, Maurice & Pestieau, Pierre, 1997. "Volunteer work and club size: Nash equilibrium and optimality," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(1), pages 9-22, July.
  6. Nitzan, Shmuel, 1994. "Modelling rent-seeking contests," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 41-60, May.
  7. Preston, Anne E, 1989. "The Nonprofit Worker in a For-Profit World," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 7(4), pages 438-63, October.
  8. Gradstein, Mark, 1998. "Optimal contest design: volume and timing of rent seeking in contests," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 14(4), pages 575-585, November.
  9. Jerry R. Green & Nancy L. Stokey, 1982. "A Comparison of Tournaments and Contracts," NBER Working Papers 0840, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  10. O'Keeffe, Mary & Viscusi, W Kip & Zeckhauser, Richard J, 1984. "Economic Contests: Comparative Reward Schemes," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 2(1), pages 27-56, January.
  11. Berry, S Keith, 1993. " Rent-Seeking with Multiple Winners," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 77(2), pages 437-43, October.
  12. William Corcoran, 1984. "Long-run equilibrium and total expenditures in rent-seeking," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 43(1), pages 89-94, January.
  13. Jack Hirshleifer, 1983. "From weakest-link to best-shot: The voluntary provision of public goods," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 41(3), pages 371-386, January.
  14. Clark, Derek J & Riis, Christian, 1998. "Competition over More Than One Prize," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(1), pages 276-89, March.
  15. Yates, Andrew J. & Heckelman, Jac C., 2001. "Rent-setting in multiple winner rent-seeking contests," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 17(4), pages 835-852, November.
  16. Edward P. Lazear & Sherwin Rosen, 1979. "Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts," NBER Working Papers 0401, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  17. Congleton, Roger D., 1989. "Efficient status seeking: Externalities, and the evolution of status games," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 11(2), pages 175-190, March.
  18. Menchik, Paul L. & Weisbrod, Burton A., 1987. "Volunteer labor supply," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(2), pages 159-183, March.
  19. Andreoni, James, 1988. "Privately provided public goods in a large economy: The limits of altruism," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(1), pages 57-73, February.
  20. Cornes, Richard, 1993. "Dyke Maintenance and Other Stories: Some Neglected Types of Public Goods," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 108(1), pages 259-71, February.
  21. Glazer, Amihai & Hassin, Refael, 1988. "Optimal Contests," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 26(1), pages 133-43, January.
  22. Perez-Castrillo, J David & Verdier, Thierry, 1992. " A General Analysis of Rent-Seeking Games," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 73(3), pages 335-50, April.
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Cited by:
  1. Thomas Markussen & Jean-Robert Tyran, 2010. "Serving the Public Interest," Discussion Papers 10-11, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
  2. Katz, Eliakim & Rosenberg, Jacob, 2005. "An economic interpretation of institutional volunteering," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 21(2), pages 429-443, June.
  3. Franz Hackl & Martin Halla & Gerald J Pruckner, 2004. "The fallacy of the Good Samaritan: Volunteering as a weird way of making money," Economics working papers 2004-15, Department of Economics, Johannes Kepler University Linz, Austria.
  4. Bauer, Thomas K. & Bredtmann, Julia & Schmidt, Christoph M., 2013. "Time vs. money — The supply of voluntary labor and charitable donations across Europe," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 32(C), pages 80-94.

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