AbstractWe present a model incorporating both social and economic components, and analyze their interaction. The notion of a social asset, an attribute that has value only because of the social institutions governing society, is introduced. In the basic model, agents match on the basis of income and unproductive attributes. An attribute has value in some equilibrium social institutions (matching patterns), but not in others. We then show that productive attributes (such as education) can have their value increased above their inherent productive value by some social institutions, leading to the notion of the social value of an asset.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania in its series PIER Working Paper Archive with number 04-025.
Length: 38 pages
Date of creation: 07 Mar 2002
Date of revision: 04 Jun 2004
Social assets; social capital; social arrangements; nonmarket interactions; social norms;
Other versions of this item:
- D20 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - General
- D31 - Microeconomics - - Distribution - - - Personal Income and Wealth Distribution
- D5 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium
- J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts
- Z13 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Social and Economic Stratification
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2005-01-02 (All new papers)
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