The connection between obtaining higher paying jobs and undertaking some seemingly irrelevant activity is interpreted as "social culture." In the context of a society trying to adopt a new technology, I show that by allowing the firms to give preferential treatment to workers based on some "cultural activity," the society can partially overcome an informational free-riding problem. Therefore, social culture may affect the economic performance by altering the effective production technology of the economy.
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Volume (Year): 91 (2001) Issue (Month): 4 (September) Pages: 924-937 Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
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Hamermesh, Daniel S & Biddle, Jeff E, 1994.
"Beauty and the Labor Market,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 84(5), pages 1174-94, December.
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Kim-Sau Chung & Peter Eso, 2007.
"Signalling with Career Concerns,"
Discussion Papers
1443, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
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George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite, 2002.
"Social Assets,"
PIER Working Paper Archive
06-003, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 04 Jun 2004.
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George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite, 2002.
"Social Assets,"
PIER Working Paper Archive
04-025, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 04 Jun 2004.
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George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite, 2006.
"Social Assets,"
International Economic Review,
Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 47(4), pages 1057-1091, November.
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