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Paper provided by UCLA Department of Economics in its series Penn CARESS Working Papers with number fa8d3cedc3b97259070110325ff2fdc2.

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1. Edward L. Glaeser & David Laibson & Jose A. Scheinkman & Christine L. Soutter, 1999. "What is Social Capital? The Determinants of Trust and Trustworthiness," NBER Working Papers 7216, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Edward L. Glaeser & David Laibson & Jose A. Scheinkman & Christine L. Soutter, 1999. "What is Social Capital? The Determinants of Trust and Trustworthiness," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1875, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
2. Jan Eeckhout & Boyan Jovanovic, 1998. "Inequality," NBER Working Papers 6841, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
3. Ghosh, Parikshit & Ray, Debraj, 1996. "Cooperation in Community Interaction without Information Flows," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 63(3), pages 491-519, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Parikshit Ghosh & Debraj Ray, 1995. "Cooperation in Community Interaction Without Information Flows," Boston University - Institute for Economic Development 64, Boston University, Institute for Economic Development.
4. David Neumark & Peter Cappelli, 1999. "Do "High Performance" Work Practices Improve Establishment-Level Outcomes?," NBER Working Papers 7374, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Peter Cappelli & David Neumark, 2001. "Do "high-performance" work practices improve establishment-level outcomes?," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, ILR Review, ILR School, Cornell University, vol. 54(4), pages 737-775, July.
5. Felli, Leonardo & Roberts, Kevin W S, 2002. "Does Competition Solve the Hold-up Problem?," CEPR Discussion Papers 3535, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Leonardo Felli & Kevin Roberts, 2001. "Does Competition Solve the Hold-up Problem?," STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series 414, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE. [Downloadable!]
   • Leonardo Felli & Kevin Roberts, . "Does Competition Solve the Hold-up Problem?," CARESS Working Papres 00-04, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
   • Leonardo Felli & Kevin Roberts, . "Does Competition Solve the Hold-up Problem?," Penn CARESS Working Papers 4a7d448e61f494c5472087aed, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
   • Leonardo Felli & Kevin Roberts, 2000. "Does Competition Solve the Hold-up Problem?," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1714, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
   • Felli, L. & Roberts, K., 2000. "Does Competition Solve the Hold-Up Problem?," Economics Papers 2000-w11, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford.
   • Felli, Leonhardo & Roberts, Kevin, 2000. "Does Competition Solve the Hold-Up Problem?," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo GmbH. [Downloadable!]
6. Kandori, Michihiro, 1992. "Social Norms and Community Enforcement," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 59(1), pages 63-80, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
7. Meyer, M.A., 1991. "The Dynamics of Learning with Team Production: Implications for Task Assignment," Papers 30, Stanford - Institute for Thoretical Economics.
8. Krueger, Alan B & Summers, Lawrence H, 1988. "Efficiency Wages and the Inter-industry Wage Structure," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(2), pages 259-93, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
9. Greif, Avner, 1993. "Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in Early Trade: the Maghribi Traders' Coalition," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(3), pages 525-48, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
10. Meyers, Margaret A, 1994. "The Dynamics of Learning with Team Production: Implications for Task Assignment," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 109(4), pages 1157-84, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
11. Farrell, Joseph & Scotchmer, Suzanne, 1988. "Partnerships," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 103(2), pages 279-97, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Joseph Farrell and Suzanne Scotchmer., 1986. "Partnerships," Economics Working Papers 8616, University of California at Berkeley.
12. Young, H Peyton, 1993. "The Evolution of Conventions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 57-84, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
13. Fudenberg, Drew & Maskin, Eric, 1986. "The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(3), pages 533-54, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
14. Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, 2000. "The Firm as a Dedicated Hierarchy: A Theory of the Origin and Growth of Firms," NBER Working Papers 7546, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, 2001. "The Firm As A Dedicated Hierarchy: A Theory Of The Origins And Growth Of Firms," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 116(3), pages 805-851, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
15. Daron Acemoglu & Jörn-Steffen Pischke, 1998. "Why Do Firms Train? Theory And Evidence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 113(1), pages 78-118, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Acemoglu, Daron & Pischke, Jörn-Steffen, 1996. "Why do Firms Train? Theory and Evidence," CEPR Discussion Papers 1460, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    • Acemoglu, D. & Pischki, J.S., 1996. "Why Do Firms Train? Theory and Evidence," Working papers 96-7, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
    • Daron Acemoglu & Jorn-Steffen Pischke, 1996. "Why Do Firms Train? Theory and Evidence," NBER Working Papers 5605, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
16. Cole, Harold L & Mailath, George J & Postlewaite, Andrew, 1992. "Social Norms, Savings Behavior, and Growth," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(6), pages 1092-1125, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
17. MacLeod, W Bentley & Malcomson, James M, 1993. "Investments, Holdup, and the Form of Market Contracts," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(4), pages 811-37, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
18. Cremer, Jacques, 1986. "Cooperation in Ongoing Organizations," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 101(1), pages 33-49, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
19. Okuno-Fujiwara Masahiro & Postlewaite Andrew, 1995. "Social Norms and Random Matching Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 79-109, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
20. Kranton, Rachel E, 1996. "The Formation of Cooperative Relationships," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 12(1), pages 214-33, April.
21. Ellison, Glenn, 1994. "Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma with Anonymous Random Matching," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 61(3), pages 567-88, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
22. Robert Gibbons & Lawrence F. Katz, 1992. "Does Unmeasured Ability Explain Inter-Industry Wage Differentials?," NBER Working Papers 3182, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Gibbons, Robert & Katz, Lawrence F, 1992. "Does Unmeasured Ability Explain Inter-industry Wage Differentials?," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 59(3), pages 515-35, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
23. Rosenthal, R W, 1979. "Sequences of Games with Varying Opponents," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(6), pages 1353-66, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
24. Bengt Holmstrom, 1982. "Moral Hazard in Teams," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 13(2), pages 324-340, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
25. Tirole, Jean, 1996. "A Theory of Collective Reputations (with Applications to the Persistence of Corruption and to Firm Quality)," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 63(1), pages 1-22, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • TIROLE, Jean, 1994. ""A Theory of Collective Reputations" with Applications to the Persistence of Corruption and to Firm Quality," IDEI Working Papers 38, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
    • Tirole, J., 1993. "A Theory of Collective Reputations with Applications to the Persistence of Corruption and to Firm Quality," Working papers 93-13, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
26. Farrell, Joseph & Maskin, Eric, 1989. "Renegotiation in repeated games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 1(4), pages 327-360, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Joseph Farrell and Eric Maskin., 1987. "Renegotiation in Repeated Games," Economics Working Papers 8759, University of California at Berkeley.

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