Leading with(out) Sacrifice? A Public-Goods Experiment with a Super-Additive Player
AbstractWe analyse two team settings in which one member in a team has stronger incentives to contribute than the others. If contributions constitute a sacrifice for the strong player, the other team members are more inclined to cooperate than if contributions are strictly dominant for the strong player.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods in its series Working Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods with number 2009_08.
Date of creation: Mar 2009
Date of revision:
Experiments; Leadership; Reciprocity; Voluntary Contribution Mechanism;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
- C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
- H40 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - General
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2009-04-18 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBE-2009-04-18 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-EXP-2009-04-18 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-PBE-2009-04-18 (Public Economics)
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