Andreas Glöckner () (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods) Bernd Irlenbusch () (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods) Sebastian Kube () (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods) Andreas Nicklisch () (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods) Hans-Theo Normann () (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods)
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We analyse two team settings in which one member in a team has stronger incentives to contribute than the others. If contributions constitute a sacrifice for the strong player, the other team members are more inclined to cooperate than if contributions are strictly dominant for the strong player.
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