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Sequential versus Simultaneous Contributions to Public Goods: Experimental Evidence

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  • Simon Gaechter
  • Daniele Nosenzo
  • Elke Renner
  • Martin Sefton

Abstract

We report an experiment comparing sequential and simultaneous contributions to a public good in a quasi-linear two-person setting (Varian, Journal of Public Economics, 1994). Our findings support the theoretical argument that sequential contributions result in lower overall provision than simultaneous contributions. However, the distribution of contributions is not as predicted: late contributors are sometimes willing to punish early low contributors by contributing less than their best response. This induces early contributors to contribute more than they otherwise would. A consequence of this is that we fail to observe a predicted first mover advantage.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by CESifo Group Munich in its series CESifo Working Paper Series with number 2602.

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Date of creation: 2009
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Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_2602

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Keywords: public goods; voluntary contributions; sequential moves; experiment;

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Cited by:
  1. Daniele Nosenzo & Martin Sefton, 2010. "Endogenous Move Structure and Volunatary Provision of Public Goods: Theory and Experiment," Discussion Papers, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham 2010-14, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
  2. Raphaële Préget & Phu Nguyen-Van & Marc Willinger, 2012. "Who are the Voluntary Leaders? Experimental Evidence from a Sequential Contribution Game," Working Papers of BETA 2012-21, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
  3. Michael Neugart & Matteo Richiardi, 2011. "Sequential Teamwork in Competitive Environments: Theory and Evidence from Swimming Data," LABORatorio R. Revelli Working Papers Series, LABORatorio R. Revelli, Centre for Employment Studies 109, LABORatorio R. Revelli, Centre for Employment Studies.
  4. Giuseppe Russo & Luigi Senatore, 2011. "A Note on Contribution Games with Loss Functions," CSEF Working Papers, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy 302, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
  5. Ludwig, Sandra & Strassmair, Christina, 2009. "An Experimental study on the information structure in teams," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University 277, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.

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