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Reciprocity, matching and conditional cooperation in two public goods games

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  • Croson, Rachel
  • Fatas, Enrique
  • Neugebauer, Tibor

Abstract

Previous experimental and empirical evidence has identified social preferences in the voluntary provision of public goods. A number of competing models of such preferences have been proposed. We provide evidence for one model of behavior in these games, reciprocity (or matching, or conditional cooperation). Consistent with previous research, we find that participants in the voluntary contribution mechanism attempt to match the contributions of others in their group. We also examine participants in a related game with different equilibria, the weakest-link mechanism. Here, in contrast, participants contribute so as to match the minimum contribution of others in their group.
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  • Croson, Rachel & Fatas, Enrique & Neugebauer, Tibor, 2005. "Reciprocity, matching and conditional cooperation in two public goods games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 87(1), pages 95-101, April.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:87:y:2005:i:1:p:95-101
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods

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