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Reciprocity, Matching and Conditional Cooperation in Two Public Goods Games

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Author Info
Rachel Croson
Enrique Fatás ()
Tibor Neugebauer

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Abstract

Previous experimental and empirical evidence has identified social preferences in the voluntary provision of public goods. A number of competing models of such preferences have been proposed. We provide evidence for one model of behavior in these games, reciprocity (or matching, or conditional cooperation). Consistent with previous research, we find that participants in the voluntary contribution mechanism attempt to match the contributions of others in their group. We also examine participants in a related game with different equilibria, the weakest-link mechanism. Here, in contrast, participa nts contribute so as to match the minimum contribution of others in their group.

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Paper provided by Institute for Social Syudies of Andalusia - Higher Council for Scientific Research in its series IESA Working Papers Series with number 0409.

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Length: 13 pages
Date of creation: 2004
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Handle: RePEc:esa:iesawp:0409

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Related research
Keywords: experimental economics; public goods; voluntary contribution mechanism; weakest link mechanism; reciprocity;

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Fischbacher, Urs & Gachter, Simon & Fehr, Ernst, 2001. "Are people conditionally cooperative? Evidence from a public goods experiment," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 71(3), pages 397-404, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. repec:att:wimass:19939 is not listed on IDEAS
  3. Camerer, Colin F. & Knez, Marc & Weber, Roberto A., 1996. "Timing and Virtual Observability in Ultimatum Bargaining and Weak Link Coordination Games," Working Papers 970, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
  4. John C. Harsanyi & Reinhard Selten, 1988. "A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262582384.
  5. James Andreoni & Rachel Croson, 2001. "Partners versus Strangers: Random Rematching in Public Goods Experiments," Levine's Working Paper Archive 563824000000000132, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
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  6. Palfrey, Thomas R & Prisbrey, Jeffrey E, 1997. "Anomalous Behavior in Public Goods Experiments: How Much and Why?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(5), pages 829-46, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Glenn W. Harrison & Jack Hirshleifer, 1988. "An Experimental Evaluation of Weakest-Link/Best Shot Models of Public Goods," UCLA Economics Working Papers 473, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  8. Keser, Claudia & van Winden, Frans, 2000. " Conditional Cooperation and Voluntary Contributions to Public Goods," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 102(1), pages 23-39, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Sugden, Robert, 1984. "Reciprocity: The Supply of Public Goods through Voluntary Contributions," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 94(376), pages 772-87, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Sonnemans, Joep & Schram, Arthur & Offerman, Theo, 1999. "Strategic behavior in public good games: when partners drift apart," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 35-41, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Claudia Keser & Frans A.A.M. van Winden, 2000. "Conditional Cooperation and Voluntary Contributions to Public Goods," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 00-011/1, Tinbergen Institute. [Downloadable!]
  12. Croson, Rachel T. A., 1996. "Partners and strangers revisited," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 25-32, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Max Albert & Werner Güth & Erich Kirchler & Boris Maciejovsky, 2007. "Are we nice(r) to nice(r) people?—An experimental analysis," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 10(1), pages 53-69, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Brekke, Kjell Arne & Kipperberg, Gorm & Nyborg, Karine, 2009. "Reluctant Recyclers: Social Interaction in Responsibility Ascription," Memorandum 16/2007, Oslo University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  3. Simon Gaechter & Daniele Nosenzo & Elke Renner & Martin Sefton, 2009. "Sequential versus Simultaneous Contributions to Public Goods: Experimental Evidence," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Tibor Neugebauer & Javier Perote & Ulrich Schmidt & Malte Loos, 2005. "Selfish-biased conditional cooperation: On the decline of contributions in repeated public goods experiments," Experimental 0503009, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Pablo Brañas-Garza & Enrique Fatas & Pablo Guillen, 2006. "Inducing a Self-Fulfilling Prophecy in Public Goods Games," ThE Papers 06/01, Department of Economic Theory and Economic History of the University of Granada.. [Downloadable!]
  6. Urs Fischbacher & Simon Gaechter, 2009. "Social Preferences, Beliefs, and the Dynamics of Free Riding in Public Good Experiments," Discussion Papers 2009-04, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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