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Regulatory constraints on executive compensation Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Joskow, Paul L.
Rose, Nancy L.
Shepard, Andrea.
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"Prepared for the Brookings Microeconomics Conference, December 11-12, 1992."
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Paper provided by Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Sloan School of Management in its series Working papers with number
3550-93..
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Date of creation: 1993Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:mit:sloanp:2461Contact details of provider: Postal: MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY (MIT), SLOAN SCHOOL OF MANAGEMENT, 50 MEMORIAL DRIVE CAMBRIDGE MASSACHUSETTS 02142 USA Phone: 617-253-2659 Web page: http://mitsloan.mit.edu/ More information through EDIRC
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Keywords: HD28 .M414 no.3550- ; 93 ; Cited by : (explanations , Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
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