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The structure of corporate ownership in privatized utilities

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  • Francesc Trillas

    ()
    (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona)

Abstract

Shareholder dispersion may be valuable because a credible commitment by shareholders not to interfere allows managers to benefit from their initiatives. A tougher regulatory regime for investors decreases the value of the commitment not to interfere implicit in a more dispersed ownership structure. Deregulation, captured through increasing monitoring costs, also has the effect of causing higher shareholder concentration. Political objectives may yield higher (through collusion between managers and politicians) or lower (through collusion between politicians and blockholders) dispersion than the benchmark case where the government maximizes shareholder proceeds. (Copyright: Fundación SEPI)

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Fundación SEPI in its journal Investigaciones Económicas.

Volume (Year): 28 (2004)
Issue (Month): 2 (May)
Pages: 257-284

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Handle: RePEc:iec:inveco:v:28:y:2004:i:2:p:257-284

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Keywords: Regulation; privatization; corporate governance; political economy;

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References

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  1. Bruno Biais & Enrico Perotti, 2002. "Machiavellian Privatization," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(1), pages 240-258, March.
  2. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 1997. "Political Economics and Macroeconomic Policy," CEPR Discussion Papers 1759, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  3. Jeffry M. Netter & William L. Megginson, 2001. "From State to Market: A Survey of Empirical Studies on Privatization," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 39(2), pages 321-389, June.
  4. Marco Pagano & Ailsa Röell, 1998. "The Choice Of Stock Ownership Structure: Agency Costs, Monitoring, And The Decision To Go Public," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 113(1), pages 187-225, February.
  5. Jean Tirole, 1991. "Privatization in Eastern Europe: Incentives and the Economics of Transition," NBER Chapters, in: NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1991, Volume 6, pages 221-268 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  6. Geddes, R Richard, 1997. "Ownership, Regulation, and Managerial Monitoring in the Electric Utility Industry," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 40(1), pages 261-88, April.
  7. Boss, Dieter & Harms, Phillipp, 1997. "Mass privatization, management control and efficiency," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 64(3), pages 343-357, June.
  8. Burkart, Mike & Gromb, Denis & Panunzi, Fausto, 1997. "Large Shareholders, Monitoring, and the Value of the Firm," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 112(3), pages 693-728, August.
  9. Steve Thompson, 1999. "Increasingly Marginal Utilities: Diversification and Free Cash Flow in Newly Privatized UK Utilities," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer, vol. 15(1), pages 25-42, August.
  10. Joskow, Paul L. & Rose, Nancy L. & Shepard, Andrea., 1993. "Regulatory constraints on executive compensation," Working papers 3550-93., Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Sloan School of Management.
  11. Demsetz, Harold & Lehn, Kenneth, 1985. "The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and Consequences," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(6), pages 1155-77, December.
  12. Schmidt, Klaus M., 1997. "The Political Economy of Mass Privatization and the Risk of Expropriation," CEPR Discussion Papers 1542, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  13. Scarpa, Carlo, 1994. "Regulation as a Bargaining Process: Negotiation over Price and Cost-Reducing Investments," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 46(3), pages 357-65, July.
  14. Roemer, J.E., 1993. "Limited Privatization inn the Presence of Public Bads," Papers 93-13, California Davis - Institute of Governmental Affairs.
  15. Trillas, Francesc, 0. "Mergers, acquisitions and control of telecommunications firms in Europe," Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, vol. 26(5-6), pages 269-286, June.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Pau Castells & Francesc Trillas, 2008. "Political parties and the economy: Macro convergence, micro partisanship?," Working Papers 2008/1, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB).
  2. Pau Castells & Francesc Trillas, 2013. "The effects of surprise political events on quoted firms: the March 2004 election in Spain," SERIEs, Spanish Economic Association, vol. 4(1), pages 83-112, March.
  3. Francesc Trillas, 2008. "Regulatory federalism in network industries," Working Papers 2008/8, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB).

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