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The structure of corporate ownership in privatized utilities

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  • Francesc Trillas

    (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona)

Abstract

Shareholder dispersion may be valuable because a credible commitment by shareholders not to interfere allows managers to benefit from their initiatives. A tougher regulatory regime for investors decreases the value of the commitment not to interfere implicit in a more dispersed ownership structure. Deregulation, captured through increasing monitoring costs, also has the effect of causing higher shareholder concentration. Political objectives may yield higher (through collusion between managers and politicians) or lower (through collusion between politicians and blockholders) dispersion than the benchmark case where the government maximizes shareholder proceeds. (Copyright: Fundación SEPI)

Suggested Citation

  • Francesc Trillas, 2004. "The structure of corporate ownership in privatized utilities," Investigaciones Economicas, Fundación SEPI, vol. 28(2), pages 257-284, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:iec:inveco:v:28:y:2004:i:2:p:257-284
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Pau Castells & Francesc Trillas, 2008. "Political parties and the economy: Macro convergence, micro partisanship?," Working Papers 2008/1, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB).
    2. Francesc Trillas, 2008. "Regulatory federalism in network industries," Working Papers 2008/8, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB).
    3. Pau Castells & Francesc Trillas, 2008. "Political parties and the economy: Macro convergence, micro partisanship?," Working Papers 2008/1, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB).
    4. Laura Valderrama, 2010. "Privatization Under Regulatory Lobbying," NCID Working Papers 04/2010, Navarra Center for International Development, University of Navarra.
    5. Francesc Trillas, 2008. "Regulatory federalism in network industries," Working Papers 2008/8, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB).
    6. Pau Castells & Francesc Trillas, 2013. "The effects of surprise political events on quoted firms: the March 2004 election in Spain," SERIEs: Journal of the Spanish Economic Association, Springer;Spanish Economic Association, vol. 4(1), pages 83-112, March.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Regulation; privatization; corporate governance; political economy;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G39 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Other
    • L33 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Comparison of Public and Private Enterprise and Nonprofit Institutions; Privatization; Contracting Out
    • L97 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Utilities: General

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