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Unions and Managerial Pay

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Author Info

  • DiNardo, J.
  • Hallock, K.
  • Pischke, J.-S.

Abstract

Unions compress the wage distribution among workers covered by union contracts. We ask whether unions also have an effect on the mangers of unionized firms. To this end we collected and assembled data on unionization and managerial pay within firms and industries in the US and across countries. Genarally, we find a negative correlation between executive compensation and unionization in our cross-section data, but no relationship of changes in unionization on the growth of compensation of executives over time.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by California Irvine - School of Social Sciences in its series Papers with number 97-98-18.

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Length: 41 pages
Date of creation: 1998
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fth:calirv:97-98-18

Contact details of provider:
Postal: UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA IRVINE, SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES, IRVINECALIFORNIA 91717 U.S.A.

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Keywords: MANAGERS ; WAGES ; LABOUR UNIONS;

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References

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  1. Jensen, M.C. & Murphy, K.J., 1988. "Performance Pay And Top Management Incentives," Papers 88-04, Rochester, Business - Managerial Economics Research Center.
  2. Bronars, Stephen G & Deere, Donald R, 1993. "Union Organizing Activity, Firm Growth, and the Business Cycle," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(1), pages 203-20, March.
  3. Richard B. Freeman, 1982. "Union wage practices and wage dispersion within establishments," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 36(1), pages 3-21, October.
  4. David Card, 1992. "The Effect of Unions on the Distribution of Wages: Redistribution or Relabelling?," NBER Working Papers 4195, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  5. Paul L. Joskow & Nancy L. Rose & Catherin D. Wolfram, 1994. "Political Constraints on Executive Compensation: Evidence from the Electric Utility Industry," NBER Working Papers 4980, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  6. Kate Bronfenbrenner, 1997. "The role of union strategies in NLRB certification elections," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 50(2), pages 195-212, January.
  7. Rosen, Sherwin, 1969. "Trade Union Power, Threat Effects and the Extent of Organization," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 36(106), pages 185-96, April.
  8. David Neumark & Michael L. Wachter, 1995. "Union effects on nonunion wages: Evidence from panel data on industries and cities," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 49(1), pages 20-38, October.
  9. Bell, B. & Pitt, M.K., 1995. "Trade Union Decline and the Distribution of Wages in the UK: Evidence from Kernel Density Estimation," Economics Papers 107, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford.
  10. Barry T. Hirsch, 1991. "Labor Unions and the Economic Performance of Unions," Books from Upjohn Press, W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, number luepf.
  11. Burda,M.C., 1995. "Unions and Wage Insurance," Papers 596, Stockholm - International Economic Studies.
  12. Abowd, John M, 1989. "The Effect of Wage Bargains on the Stock Market Value of the Firm," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(4), pages 774-800, September.
  13. Brian J. Hall & Jeffrey B. Liebman, 1997. "Are CEOs Paid Like Bureaucrats?," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1789, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
  14. Ruback, Richard S & Zimmerman, Martin B, 1984. "Unionization and Profitability: Evidence from the Capital Market," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 92(6), pages 1134-57, December.
  15. Joskow, Paul L. & Rose, Nancy L. & Shepard, Andrea., 1993. "Regulatory constraints on executive compensation," Working papers 3550-93., Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Sloan School of Management.
  16. Brian J. Hall & Jeffrey B. Liebman, 1997. "Are CEOs Really Paid Like Bureaucrats?," NBER Working Papers 6213, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Rafael Gomez & Konstantinos Tzioumis, 2006. "What do unions do to executive compensation?," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 19865, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  2. Richard B. Freeman, 2000. "Single Peaked Vs. Diversified Capitalism: The Relation Between Economic Institutions and Outcomes," NBER Working Papers 7556, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  3. Carola Frydman & Raven Molloy, 2011. "Pay Cuts for the Boss: Executive Compensation in the 1940s," NBER Working Papers 17303, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  4. Daron Acemoglu & James A. Robinson, 2013. "Economics versus Politics: Pitfalls of Policy Advice," NBER Working Papers 18921, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

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