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Executive Compensation and Competition in the Banking and Financial Sectors

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Author Info
Cuñat, Vicente (Universitat Pompeu Fabra)
Guadalupe, Maria () (Columbia University, CEPR and IZA Bonn)

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Abstract

This paper studies the effect of product market competition on the compensation packages that firms offer to their executives and in particular its impact on the sensitivity of pay to performance. To measure the effect of competition we use two different identification strategies on a panel of US executives. We exploit two deregulation episodes in the banking and financial sectors as quasi-natural experiments. We provide difference in differences estimates of the effect of competition on estimated performance-pay sensitivities and on the sensitivity of stock option grants. Our results indicate that a higher level of product market competition increases the performance pay sensitivity of executive compensation schemes.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in its series IZA Discussion Papers with number 1123.

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Length: 36 pages
Date of creation: Apr 2004
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp1123

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Related research
Keywords: executive compensation; product market competition; performance related pay;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
M52 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Personnel Economics - - - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
J31 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Benjamin E. Hermalin., 1991. "The Effects of Competition on Executive Behavior," Economics Working Papers 91-182, University of California at Berkeley.
    Other versions:
  2. Brian J. Hall & Jeffrey B. Liebman, 1998. "Are CEOs Really Paid Like Bureaucrats?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 113(3), pages 653-691, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Yermack, David, 1995. "Do corporations award CEO stock options effectively?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(2-3), pages 237-269. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. David Scharfstein, 1988. "Product-Market Competition and Managerial Slack," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 19(1), pages 147-155, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Michael Raith, 2003. "Competition, Risk, and Managerial Incentives," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(4), pages 1425-1436, September. [Downloadable!]
  6. Shapiro, Carl & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1984. "Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Discipline Device," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(3), pages 433-44, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Stiroh, Kevin J & Strahan, Philip E, 2003. " Competitive Dynamics of Deregulation: Evidence from U.S. Banking," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 35(5), pages 801-28, October.
  8. Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, 2001. "Are Ceos Rewarded For Luck? The Ones Without Principals Are," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 116(3), pages 901-932, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Bebchuk, Lucian Arye & Fried, Jesse & Walker, David I, 2002. "Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation," CEPR Discussion Papers 3558, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  10. Paul L. Joskow & Nancy L. Rose & Catherine Wolfram, 1996. "Political Constraints on Executive Compensation: Evidence from the Electric Utility Industry," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 27(1), pages 165-182, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  11. Sherwin Rosen, 1990. "Contracts and the Market for Executives," NBER Working Papers 3542, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Oliver D. Hart, 1983. "The Market Mechanism as an Incentive Scheme," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 14(2), pages 366-382, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Jayaratne, Jith & Strahan, Philip E, 1996. "The Finance-Growth Nexus: Evidence from Bank Branch Deregulation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 111(3), pages 639-70, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Bengt Holmstrom & Paul R. Milgrom, 1985. "Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 742, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  15. Joskow, Paul L. & Rose, Nancy L. & Shepard, Andrea., 1993. "Regulatory constraints on executive compensation," Working papers 3550-93., Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Sloan School of Management. [Downloadable!]
  16. Schmidt, Klaus M, 1997. "Managerial Incentives and Product Market Competition," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 64(2), pages 191-213, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  17. James A. Mirrlees, 1976. "The Optimal Structure of Incentives and Authority Within an Organization," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 7(1), pages 105-131, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  18. Nichols, Mark W. & Hendrickson, Jill M., 1997. "Profit Differentials Between Canadian and U.S. Commercial Banks: the Role of Regulation," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 57(03), pages 674-696, September. [Downloadable!]
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Vicente Cuñat & Maria Guadalupe, 2009. "Globalization and the Provision of Incentives inside the Firm: The Effect of Foreign Competition," Economics Working Papers 1134, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Cuñat, Vicente & Guadalupe, Maria, 2006. "Globalization and the Provision of Incentives Inside the Firm," CEPR Discussion Papers 5950, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Arantxa Jarque, 2008. "CEO compensation : trends, market changes, and regulation," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue Sum, pages 265-300. [Downloadable!]
  4. Stefan Beiner & Markus Schmid & Gabrielle Wanzenried, 2004. "Product Market Competition, Managerial Inventives, and Firm Valuation," Diskussionsschriften dp0412, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft. [Downloadable!]
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