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Quand la réglementation environmentale profite aux polleurs. Survol des fondements théoriques de l'hypothèse de Porter

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Ambec, Stefan
Barla, Philippe

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Abstract

Cet article présente de manière non technique certains des fondements théoriques possibles de l'hypothèse de Porter selon laquelle, des réglementations environmentales strictes peuvent améliorer le profit des industries qui y sont soumises. Après une brève présentation de l'hypothèse, les arguments basés sur l'existence d'imperfections au sein de l'entreprise sont passés en revue. Les imperfections du marché susceptibles d'éventuellement justifier l'hypothèse de Porter sont ensuite discutées. Les principales conclusions de ce survol sont: i) l'hypothèse de Porter requiert l'interaction de l'externalité environmentale avec au moins une autre source de distorsions, ii) le type d'intervention publique qui peut aboutir à un effet à la Porter dépend de la nature des distortions qui interagissent. L'atteinte de l'optimum peut exiger l'usage de plusieurs instruments, iii) l'exploration empirique de l'hypothèse de Porter doit, pour être valide, autoriser la présence de ces multiples distorsions./This paper reviews in a non-technical presentation some of the theoretical foundations of the Porter Hypothesis that argues that strict environmental regulations may increase the profits of industries that have to respect them. After a short presentation of the hypothesis, some of the arguments based firms organizational failures are presented. Arguments based on market failures are then discussed. The main conclusion of this review are: i) the Porter Hypothesis requires the presence of at least one distortion beside the environmental externality, ii) the type of environmental regulations leading to the Porter result depends upon the nature of the interacting distortions. Furthermore, reaching the optimum will usually require using several regulatory instruments, iii) empirical testing of the Porter hypothesis has to allow for the presence of multiple distortions to be valid.

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Paper provided by GREEN in its series Cahiers de recherche with number 0504.

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Date of creation: 2005
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Handle: RePEc:lvl:lagrcr:0504

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Related research
Keywords: Réglementation environmentale hypothèse de Porter compétitivité environmental regulations Porter Hypothesis competitiveness

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
Q50 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - General
Q52 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Pollution Control Costs; Distributional Effects; Employment Effects
Q55 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environmental Economics: Technological Innovation

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. d'Aspremont, Claude & Jacquemin, Alexis, 1988. "Cooperative and Noncooperative R&D in Duopoly with Spillovers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(5), pages 1133-37, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Aghion, Ph. & Dewatripont, M. & Rey, P., 1997. "Corporate governance, competition policy and industrial policy," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 41(3-5), pages 797-805, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Adam B. Jaffe & Karen Palmer, 1997. "Environmental Regulation And Innovation: A Panel Data Study," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 79(4), pages 610-619, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  4. Ambec, Stefan & Barla, Philippe, 2002. "A theoretical foundation of the Porter hypothesis," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 75(3), pages 355-360, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. Palmer, Karen & Oates, Wallace E & Portney, Paul R, 1995. "Tightening Environmental Standards: The Benefit-Cost or the No-Cost Paradigm?," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 9(4), pages 119-32, Fall. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Simpson, R. David & Bradford, Robert III, 1996. "Taxing Variable Cost: Environmental Regulation as Industrial Policy," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 30(3), pages 282-300, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Ambec, Stefan & Barla, Philippe, 2005. "Can Environmental Regulations be Good for Business? an Assessment of the Porter Hypothesis," Cahiers de recherche 0505, GREEN. [Downloadable!]
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  2. Ambec, S. & Lanoie, P., 2007. "When and why does it pay to be green ?," Working Papers 200704, Grenoble Applied Economics Laboratory (GAEL). [Downloadable!]
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  3. Lanoie, P. & Laurent-Lucchetti, L. & Johnstone, N. & Ambec, S., 2007. "Environmental policy, innovation and performance : new insights on the Porter hypothesis," Working Papers 200706, Grenoble Applied Economics Laboratory (GAEL). [Downloadable!]
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